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I. Introduction
The title indicates that the thesis will deal mainly with two problems: the responsibility
of international organizations for their acts in international law and the responsibility of
their member states for these acts.
Part II will explore what kinds of international organizations exist and what requirements
must be met by an international organization to be able to act under international law.
It will show that an international organization which has the capacity to act under
international law is an international person. The meaning, the source, and the scope of
this personality will be analyzed.
Part III will investigate the international responsibility of such an international
organization. It will explain why an international organization is responsible for its illegal
acts. It will also explain what rules of responsibility are applicable and how they are
applied to an international organization.
Part IV will answer the question whether and under what circumstances the member
states of an international organization are responsible. This section will differentiate
between the responsibility of member states for their own conduct and the responsibility
for conduct of their organization. It will be revealed also that the responsibility of the
member states for the acts of their organization is restricted. Finally it will show how
this responsibility is attributed to the member states and how it is shared among them.
1
rll. International Organizations in International Law
A. Types of International Organizations
There are different types of international organizations depending upon the different
founding subjects and applicable legal orders. The notion "international" does not
indicate that an international organization has the power to act under international law.
Therefore not every international organization has the capacity of committing breaches
of international law . That is why the different types of international organizations have
to be examined in order to determine their capacity in and under international law.
1. Public International Organization 1
To create a public international organization, several criteria have to be met:2
First, the organization must be established by an international agreement which places
it under the order of international law . Secondly, the organization must be equipped with
1 Terminology used by HENRY G. SCHERMERS,INTERNATIONALINSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 8, § 11, (2d ed. 1980) and art.34 (2) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 United States Statutes At Large 1031, 1059
(hereinafter Stat.).
2 See SCHERMERS, supra note 1, at 8-9, § 11; IGNAZ SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN/G.LOIBL, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen
einschlieBlich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften, 3, Nr 0105, (5th ed. 1992);
Julio A. Barberis, Nouvelles Questions Concernant la Personnalite Juridique
Internationale, in 179 Recueil Des Cours d' Academie de Droit International
(R.C.A.D.I.) 145, 216 (19831). See also WERNERJ. FELD/RoBERT S. JORDAN,
INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS,A COMPARATIVEApPROACH41 passim (2d
ed.1988) for the motivations to create or join public international organizations.
The United Nations (hereinafter UN) are an example for such an organization,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
2
3organs capable of expressing the independent will of the organization. Thirdly, the
organization must have defined aims. And, in order to reach these aims, it must be
established for an appropriate period of time.
a. International Agreement as Founding Instrument
Only an international agreement, an agreement concluded by subjects of international
law, can create a public international organization. An agreement by subjects of national
law cannot create a public international organization because these subjects do not have
such capacity under international law .
Most of the time, such an international agreement is a written treaty, 3 since it provides
more security and clarity in regard to the aims and competences of the organization. But
it is recognized that a public international organization can also be created by other forms
of agreement. 4
As to the subjects of international law having the capacity to establish such an
organization, reference has to be made to states as original subjects of international law .
Their power to create a public international organization is unquestioned.5 However, it
is uncertain whether public international organizations also have such power. Although
it is recognized that public international organizations can be members of another public
international organization,6 their creating capacity is denied.7 Taking into account that
3 Yasseen, in A HANDBOOKON INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS34 (R.J. Dupuy
ed., 1988) (hereinafter HANDBOOK).
4 SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 9, § 12 (giving some examples); Barberis, supra
note 2, at 217.
5 SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 9, § 12; Yasseen, supra note 3, at 34.
6 SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN/LOIBL,supra note 2, at 5, Nr 0110; Vignes, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 59. See Henry G. Schermers, International
Organizations as Members of Other International Organizations, in FESTSCHRIFf
4these organizations can conclude treaties, if their constituting treaties confer them the
treaty-making power, with states or other public international organizations, 8 it is
contradictory to deny them the power to create another public international organization
as long as the so-created organization can support the constitutional aims of the founding
organizations. If this requirement is fulfilled, the creating capacity of public international
organizations should be recognized. 9
b. International Law as Legal Order
An organization is. a public international organization only if it is governed by
international law because only then does it have an international personality distinct from
that of its founders. If an organization is governed by national law, it has a national, not
an international, personality.
FOR HERMANNMOSLER823, 832 (1983) for the membership of the EEC in other
international organizations.
7 See SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 10, § 14; Yasseen, supra note 3, at 34. See
also SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LoIBL,supra note 2, at 3-5, Nr 0105/0110.
8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, March 21, 1986, art.6, 25
International Legal Materials (I.L.M.) 543, 549 (1986). See generally Paul
Reuter, First Repon on the Question of Treaties Concluded Between States and
International Organizations or Between two or More International Organizations,
1972 II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 171, 178-182,
U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/258 (hereinafter Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n) on the question of the
treaty-making power of an international organization.
9 Barberis, supra note 2, at 218. Therefore the term "public international
organization" is used instead of "international governmental organization".
5Therefore, an agreement which forms a public international organization has to make
sure that the organization is governed by international law. 10 The creating members
determine whether the system of national or international law is decisive for that
organization. This is true even if only public international organizations create a public
international organization because they can place the created organization under the legal
system of one of their member states instead of international law .
c. Aims and Duration
In order to contribute to international cooperation, a public international organization
must have clearly defined aims. These aims, as well as the competences to 'achieve
them,l1 have to be laid down in the constituting agreement.12 But even with a set of
clearly defined aims and related competences, an organization is an ephemeral entity, if
its constituting agreement does not provide an appropriate period of time to enable the
organization to accomplish those aims. 13
If these requirements are met, a failure to fulfill one of those aIms will be
inconsequential, since this will be a question of fact but not of law. 14
10 Epping, in KNur IpSEN, VOLKERRECHT 68 (3d ed. 1990) (hereinafter
VOLKERRECHT);SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 15, § 22 ; Barberis, supra note 2,
at 220.
11 Epping, in VOLKERRECHT,supra note 10, at 68.
12 SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN/LOffiL,supra note 2, at 4, Nr 0105. See also Roland
Vaubel, A Public Choice View of International Organization, in THE POLITICAL
EcONOMY OF INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS27, 31 passim (Roland
Vaubel/Thomas D. Willet eds., 1991) for an assessment of how the
decision makers of an organization influence the achievement of these aims.
13 SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LoffiL,supra note 2, at 3, Nr 0105.
14 Contra id. at 6, Nr 0112.
6d. Own Organs
To complete the task for which it is founded, an organization needs its own organsY
This is an essential condition, because an organization cannot act without its organs. Not
only does an organization need organs, but also the organs must be independent from any
particular member16 to be able to declare their own will. 17Otherwise, there would not
be a seperate legal personality.
2. Private International Organization
A private international organization differs from a public international organization in so
far as it is not created by an international agreement,18 and it is not governed by
international law.19 A private international organization is that which is established
under the regime of a state's municipal law.20 That is why it does not have an
15 SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 14, § 21.
16 Jd.
17 SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN/LoIBL,supra note 2, at 5, Nr 0111. See also Barberis,
supra note 2, at 219.
18 SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN/LOIBL,supra note 2, at 2, Nr 0103; Epping, m
VOLKERRECHTsupra note 10, at 73.
19 SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 16, § 23. An exception to this is the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Although created under the municipal law of
Switzerland, it is to some extent governed by the four Geneva Conventions,
August 12, 1949, 75 United Nations Treaty Series 31, 85, 135, 287 (1950)
(hereinafter U.N.T.S.) and the Additional Protocols, December 12, 1977, 16
I.L.M. 1391, 1442 (1977). See generally Jean-Luc Blondel, Getting Access to the
Victims: Role and Activities of the JCRC, in THE POLITICSOF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS382 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 1989).
20 This law is private law which explains the notion of private international
organization, SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 16, § 23. These organizations are,
however, not private in the sense that no governmental organs are engaged,
although most of them consist only of private - natural or moral -persons. These
r
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international personality but only a national personality. Without an international
personality, it is not a subject of international law and therefore cannot commit breaches
of international law . Because of its inability to act illegaly under international law , this
paper will not examine further private international organization.
3. International Enterprise
There are some confusions about terminology in regard to the international enterprises.
An international enterprise can be called international corporation,21 international public
venture, 22 public international company, 23 common inter-state enterprise, 24
erablissement publique internationaf5 or entreprise publique international. 26
Despite the differences in terminology there is consensus on its legal classification to
some extent. This organization can be - contrary to what was said for a private
organizations are called international organizations because they persue
international purposes, SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LoffiL,supra note 2, at 2, Nr
0103. Examples for such organizations are Amnesty International and
Greenpeace. See also CLIVE ARCHER, INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS38
passim (2d ed.1992) (distinguishing between certain types of private international
organizations) .
21 F.A.Mann, International Corporations and National Law, 42 The British Year
Book Of International Law (BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L.) 145 (1967).
22 I.F .I.Shihata, Role of Law in Economic Development: The Legal Problems of
International Public Ventures, 25 REVUEEGYPTIENNEDE DROITINTERNATIONAL
(R.E.D.I.) 119, 123 (1969).
23 SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 19, § 26.
24 IGNAZSEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,CORPORATIONSIN ANDUNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 109 (1987) (hereinafter CORPORATIONS).
25 H.T.ADAM, LES ETABLISSEMENTSPUBLICSINTERNATIONAUX11 (1957).
26 Barberis, supra note 2, at 232.
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international organization - created by an international agreement between states,27 but
it is nevertheless placed under the regime of domestic law. 28Even when the agreement
provides that the domestic law will apply only residuarily beside the rules of the
constituting treaty of the enterprise, the domestic law will still have its effects upon the
enterprise. 29
There may be other means of distinguishing a public international organization and an
international enterprise,30 but the fact that national law governs the behaviour of the
international enterprise is the most important one.31 If such an enterprise is founded by
an international agreement, and if the treaty provides for application of international law ,
it is - though persuing economical goals - a public international organization.32
27 See the authors in footnote 21, 23, 26 and SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,
CORPORATIONS,supra note 24, at 112. It is questionable whether public
international organizations can also create an international enterprise. But if one
accepts that they can create a public international organization, one has also to
accept - a majore ad minus - that they can create an international enterprise. The
Andean Development Corporation is an example for such an enterprise, 81.L.M.
940 (1969).
28 See authors in note 27.
29 F.A.Mann, supra note 21, at 147.
30 See H.T.ADAM, supra note 25, at 11-13.
31 SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 20, § 28.
32 F.A.Mann, supra note 21, at 148. But see Barberis, supra note 2, at 235
(considering an enterprise which is governed exclusively by its constituting treaty
as an international enterprise. However, it is a public international organization
because the constituting treaty which is not placed under the regime of one
contracting party's domestic law has to be classified as international law,
Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization, 23 I.L.M.
1071, 1081-82 (International Chamber of Commerce, Court of Arbitration, 1984),
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,CORPORATIONS,supra note 24, at 114). See also
Zagaris, The Rising Utility of the Public International Corporation, 6 DENVER
JOURNALOF INTERNATIONALAW ANDPOLICY43, 45 (1976).
9The international enterprise which is discussed in this subsection has no international
personality. This follows from the fact that it is not governed by international law. 33
The international enterprise is therefore unable to act illegally under international law,
and thus, it will not be examined in this paper.
B. Public International Organizations as Subjects of International Law
In Part A it was said that a public international organization (hereinafter international
organization) has an international personality. This makes an international organization
the subject of international law . It has therefore the capacity of committing breaches of
international law. Since this capacity depends upon its personality, the notion of
international personality needs to be illuminated.
Not until the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) in
"Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations" 34 was the
international personality of the international organization generally accepted.35 The
Court stated that "the Organisation was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact
exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis
of the possession of a large measure of international personality ... It must be
33 Exception has to be made for the type of enterprise which is mentioned in note
32.
34 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (April 11).
35 See Bardo Fassbender, Die Volkerrechtssubjektivitlit internationaler
Organisationen, 37 OSTERREICHISCHEZEITSCHRIFf FOR OFFENTLICHESRECHT
UND VOLKERRECHT(O.Z.o.R.V.) 17, 18 (1986) for the history of recognizing
international organizations as international persons. See generally HAROLDK.
JACOBSON,NETWORKSOF INTERDEPENDENCE,INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS
ANDTHEGLOBALPOLITICALSYSTEM21 passim (2d ed.1984) for the history of
public and private international organizations.
10
acknowledged that its members, by entrusting certain functions to it, have clothed it with
the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged. 1136
Although the advisory opinion was only concerned with the international personality of
the United Nations (hereinafter UN), it was the starting point of recognizing international
organizations as international persons distinct from their members. 37
1. Meaning of International Personality
International personality means to be a subject/person38 of international law by receiving
rights and obligations of the international legal system.39 Thus, the international
personality is a consequence of being part of the international legal community. It is only
a formal description40 which does not say what rights and obligations are conferred to
36 1949 LC.J. at 179.
37 Eckart Klein, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of UN (Advisory
Opinion), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIAOF PUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW (E.P.I.L.),
DECISIONSOF INTERNATIONALCOURTSAND TRIBUNALSAND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS242, 244 (R.Bernhardt ed., 1981).
38 These notions are synonyms, Hermann Mosler, Reflexions Sur La Personnalite
Juridique En Droit International Public, in MELANGESOFFERTSA HENRIROLIN,
PROBLEMESDE DROITSDE GENS, 228, 233/234 (1964).
39 Barberis, supra note 2, at 168; Hans Kelsen, Theorie Du Droit International
Public, in 84 R.C.A.D.L 1, 101 (1953III); Mosler, supra note 38, at 233/234;
Pierre Pescatore, Les Relations Exterieures Des Communautes Europeennes, in
103 R.C.A.D.L 1, 29/30 (1961II).
40 Ke1sen, supra note 39, at 101.
11
the international person.41 However, this description is useful,42 because it makes clear
that someone has "the capacity to operate upon the international plane" .43
2. Source of International Personality
The statement of the Court left uncertain whether the international personality of the UN
deduces from the rights and obligations laid down in the Charter of the UN, or whether
these rights and obligations bestowed upon the UN derive from its international
personality. The above definition leads to the conclusion that the international personality
derives from the rights and obligations which are imposed upon the international
organization44 and not vice versa.45
Following that reasoning, the question remains as to who within the international society
imposes the rights and obligations upon the international organization. By bringing the
organization into being, the founders confer certain rights and obligations upon it. These
rights and obligations are laid down in the treaty which establishes the organization.
41 Barberis, supra note 2, at 168; Kelsen, supra note 39, at 101; Mosler, supra note
38, at 240; Pescatore, supra note 39, at 44. See E. Lauterpacht, TheDevelopment
of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of International
Tribunals, in 152 R.C.A.D.1. 377, 407/409 (1976IV); D.P.O'Connell, La
Personnalite En Droit International, 67 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONALPUBLIC(R.G.D.I.P.) 5, 28/29 (1963).
42 Contra Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied
Powers of International Organizations, 44 BRIT.Y.B.lNT'L L. 111, 113 (1970).
43 1949 I.C.I. at 179. See SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 776/777, § 1389.
44 Mosler, supra note 38, at 241.
45 Contra P.K. Menon, International Organizations as Subjects of International
Law, 70 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALDE SCIENCESDIPLOMATIQUESET
POLITIQUES(R.D.I.) 61, 68/77 (1992); Rama-Montaldo, supra note 44, at
137/139. See also Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties, 1953 II Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 90, 141, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/63 (deducing the treaty-making power of an
international organization from its international personality).
12
Thus, by attributing rights and obligations to the international organization, the
constituting treaty determines the international personality of the international
organization.46
Some treaties provide expressly that the international organization has an international
personality, e.g., art.6 ECSC- and art.210 EEC-treaty.47 But such declaration does not
confer any more rights or obligations to the international organization than those already
conferred upon i~8. On the contrary, if the treaty declares that the organization has an
international personality but fails to attribute rights and obligations to it, such declaration
is meaningless and cannot create any international personality. 49
Because the rights and obligations conferred upon international organizations vary
according to the aims and purposes of these organizations, the extent of international
46 Rene-Jean Dupuy, Le Droit Des Relations Entre Les Organisations
Intemationales, in 100 RC.A.D.1. 457, 532 (1960II); F.A. Mann, Diejuristische
Person des VOlkerrechts, 152 ZEITSCHRIFfFUR DASGESAMTEHANDELSRECHT
UNO WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT303, 305 (1988); Pescatore, supra note 39, at 44;
Yasseen, supra note 3, at 45; Karl Zemanek, Internationale Organisationen als
Handlungseinheiten in der VOlkerrechtsgemeinschaft, 7 b.Z.6.RV. 335, 351
(1956). See SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LoffiL,supra note 2, at 38-39, Nr 0310;
Gerald G.Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Coun of
Justice: International Organizations and Tribunals, 29 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 1, 3
(1952); MALCOLMN. SHAW, INTERNATIONALAW 772-773 (3d ed. 1991). See
PlllLIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 24-25 (1959) for the
international personality of the UN. See also Fassbender, supra note 35, at 31
n.83, for more references. Contra Finn Seyerstedt, International Personality of
Intergovernmental Organizations: Do Their Capacity Really Depend upon Their
Constitutions 1, 4 INDIANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW (I.J.I.L.) 1, 53
(1964).
47 Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140, 149 (1957); Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 86 (1958). See SCHERMERS,
supra note 1, at 774, § 1386 n. 7, for more treaty articles of this kind.
48 SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN/LoffiL,supra note 2, at 43, Nr 0324.
49 Mosler, supra note 38, at 245/246. But see Mann, supra note 46, at 306.
13
personalities vanes, too. 50 Some international organizations have, therefore, greater
international personalities than others. Even so, "that is not the same thing as saying that
it is a state ... or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of
a state", 51 because international organizations are not original subjects of international
law52 like states. 53
3. Scope of International Personality
A treaty which establishes an international organization IS binding only for the
contracting parties54 which are the members of the organization. The treaty is therefore
"res inter alios acta" for the third parties. This does not mean that the international
personality of an international organization is real only for those which have ratified the
treaty. 55 Because of its international personality, an international organization can
commit breaches of international law . It can therefore violate the international rights of
non-members. If the international organization was not existing as a subject of
international law, it could not violate the rights of non-members. However, the
50 Dupuy, supra note 46, at 530; Mosler, supra note 38, at 240.
51 1949 I.C.J. at 179.
52 Contra Seyerstedt, supra note 46, at 61-62. See Rama-Montaldo, supra note 42,
at 147.
53 E.g. Epping, in VOLKERRECHT,supra note 10, at 54.
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.34, 1155
D.N.T.S. 331, 341. The rule in art.34 is customary international law and an
expression of the principle of consent, e.g., Heintschel v. Heinegg, in
VOLKERRECHT,supra note 10, at 138. Although art.34 speaks only of
states, it is assumed that the customary rule is in force for all subjects of
international law .
55 Contra SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LoIBL,supra note 2, at 42, Nr 0321; Mann, supra
note 21, at 152.
14
international personality of an international organization is not opposable to non-
members, since subjects of international law cannot impose any obligation on the third
parties by treaties unless the third parties consent to the obligation.56 If the international
personality of an international organization was opposable to non-members, they would
have to accept the responsibility of the international organization. Since the international
personality of an international organization results from its constituting treaty, the
obligation to accept its responsibility is also a consequence of that treaty. Therefore the
international personality of an international organization is not opposable to non-
members, unless they recognize the international organization as a subject of international
lawY By recognizing the international organization the non-members declare their
consent that the international personality of the organization is opposable to them, and
that the organization is responsible for its wrongful acts. That recognition does not mean
that the non-members confer the organization a new international personality which is
different from that conferred by the members. It means that they take the existing
international personality of the organization into account, and that they accept it as a
subject of international law. It can, therefore, be said that the non-members rely on the
already existing international personality. In this respect, the international personality is
objective. 58 Thus, the recognition of an international organization by non-members is
only declarative59 and not constitutive. 60
56 Supra note 54.
57 Dupuy, supra note 46, at 556; Mosler, supra note 38, at 249; Yasseen, supra
note 3, at 47.
58 Dupuy, supra note 46, at 555/556; Fitzmaurice, supra note 46, at 4/5; Mosler,
supra note 38, at 249/250; ; Zemanek, supra note 46, at 357. See Yasseen, supra
note 3, at 47.
59 Dupuy, supra note 46, at 556; Zemanek, supra note 46, at 357; Ingolf Pernice,
Die Haftung internationaler Organisationen und ihrer Mitarbeiter, 26 ARCHlY
15
Concerning the international personality of the UN, the ICI in its aforementioned
advisory opinion had another perspective. It stated that" fifty states, representing the vast
majority of the members of the international community, had the power, in conformity
with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international
personality and not merely recognised by them alone, together with capacity to bring
international claims ( against non-members)".61 This statement may be invoked by the
Court to encourage the non-members to join the UN and to strengthen its work. Yet, this
passage is inconsistent with the above cited rule of "res inter alios acta". Even though
the vast majority of the states of the present international community are also members
of the UN, this does not create an objective personality which is opposable to non-
. members.62 This is because the international law is still governed by the principle of
consent which is inherent in the principle of "res inter alios acta".
As long as the international community is a community of equals, the majority cannot
impose any obligation upon the minority without its consent. Therefore, despite the
opinion of the ICI, the international personality of an international organization is not
opposable to non-members, unless they have recognized the international organization.
DESVOLKERRECHTS(A.V.R.) 406,417 (1988).
60 Contra SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LomL,supra note 2, at 78, Nr 0702.
61 1949 I.C.J. at 185.
62 See Dupuy, supra note 46, at 555 (arguing against the element of quantity). See
also SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,CORPORATIONS,supra note 24, at 88 (saying that
the objective personality of the UN is an exception). But see SCHERMERS,supra
note 1, at 778, § 1391 (differentiating between universal and closed organizations
and assuming that the universal organizations have an opposable objective
personality). See also Michael Bothe, Die vOlkerrechtliche Stellung der
Europliischen Gemeinschaften im VOlkerrecht, 37 ZEITSCHRIFf FOR
AUSLANoISCHESOFFENTLICHESRECHTUNOVOLKERRECHT(Z.a.6.R. V.) 121, 125
(1977) (assuming that an erga omnes rule of opposable objective personality may
be in development).
ill.International Responsibility of Public International Organizations
An international organization commits breaches of international law when it violates the
obligations which are imposed upon it by its founding treaty. This capacity of the
international organization to act illegally under the international law requires it to be
responsible for its wrongful acts,63 since "responsibility is an indispensable element of
any legal system". 64Otherwise, there would be only moral, but no legal, obligations.65
The responsibilities of international organizations correspond to their international
personalities66 because the personalities determine the capacity to act upon the
international plane. As the personalities vary according to the rights and obligations, the
63 Werner Meng, Intemationale Organisationen im viJlkerrechtlichen Deliktsrecht,
45 Z.a.o.R.V. 324, 328 (1985); INGO V. MUNCH, DAS VOLKERRECHTLICHE
DELIKT IN DERMODERNENENTWICKLUNGDER VOLKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFf
254 (1963). See Ipsen, in VOLKERRECHT,supra note 10, at 529.
64 BING CHENG, GENERALPRINCIPLESOF LAW AS ApPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS170 (1953). See Affaire Des Biens Britanniques Au
Maroc Espagnol (Spain v. United Kingdom), II UNITED NATIONSREpORTSOF
INTERNATIONALARBITRALAWARDS(R.I.A.A., Max Huber) 615, 641 (1925).
See CLYDEEAGLETON,THE RESPONSIBILITYOFSTATESIN INTERNATIONALAW
3 (1928); ALFREDVERDROSS,VOLKERRECHT373 (5th ed.1964).
65 FRIEDRICHBERBER,LEHRBUCHDESVOLKERRECHTS,III.Band 2 (2d ed. 1977).
66 See D.W. BoWETT, THE LAWOF INTERNATIONALINSTITUTIONS362-363 (4th ed.
1982); Clyde Eagleton, Intemational Organization and the Law of Responsibility,
in 76 R.C.A.D.1. 319, 386 (19501); HERMANNMOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETYASALEGALCOMMUNITY50 and 170 (1980); Paul Reuter, Sur Quelques
Limites Du Droit Des Organisations Intemationales, in FESTSCHRIFfFURRUDOLF
BINDSCHEDLER 491, 505 (1980); Ralph Zacklin, Responsabilite Des
Organisations Intemationales, in LA RESPONSABILITEDANS LE SYSTEME
INTERNATIONAL(Colloque du Mans de la Societe fran~aise pour Ie droit
international) 91, at 91 (1991).
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scope of responsibilities of the international organizations also vary. 67 The greater their
capacities under international law , the greater their scope of responsibilities.
The fact that an international organization is responsible for its breaches of international
law does not answer the question which rules of responsibility are applicable to the
international organization. This question will be examined in the next section.
A. Rules of Responsibility of Public International Organizations
There are customary rules for responsibility arising out of breaches of international law
which have evolved from state practice.68 Art.38 (1) c ICJ-statute69 indicates that
practice of the states flowing out of a sense of legal obligation is a source of international
law.
Yet, before discussing whether these rules are binding upon an international organization,
it would be appropriate to look for rules of responsibility which have evolved from the
practice of the international organizations.7o The practice of international organizations
67 Konrad Ginther, International Organizations, Responsibility, in 5 E.P.LL.,
INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONSIN GENERAL, UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS162, at 162 (R.Bernhardt ed., 1983). See MDNCH, supra note
63, at 257.
68 See the draft articles on state responsibility by the International Law Commission
(hereinafter LL.C.) 1980 II/2 Y.B.Int'1 L.Comm'n 1, 30, U.N.Doc.A/35/l0. See
generally Bruno Simma, Grundfragen der Staatenverantwonlichkeit in der Arbeit
der International Law Commission, 24 A.V.R. 357 (1986) and Philipp Allott,
State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29 HARVARD
INTERNATIONALLAW JOURNAL(H.LL.J.) 1 (1989) on the codification of the
rules of state responsibility by the LL.C.
69 Supra note 1, at 1060.
70 The LL.C. in its commentary on art.B of its draft on state responsibility says
that "the responsibility of international organizations is governed by rules which
are not necessarily the same as those governing the responsibility of States."
Repon of the Commission to the General Assembly, 197511Y.B.lnt'l L. Comm'n
47, 90, DOC.A/l00I0/REV.1. But see Reuter, supra note 66, at 506 (assuming
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can also create international1aw,71 since art. 38 (1) c of the ICJ-statute speaks in general
terms of practice and not of state practice alone.
However, there is not yet sufficient practice of international organizations in this fie1d72
which meets the requirements in art.38 (1) c ICJ-statute, namely a general, consistent and
repeated practice.73 The only existing rules of responsibility are those of state practice.
B. Rules of State Responsibility
It is assumed that an international organization is bound by customary international law
which is developed by state practice because the member states cannot escape their
international obligations by creating an international organization which is not bound by
these obligations.74 But this assumption does not take into account that the international
organization is an international person distinct from its founding members.7s This does
not explain why the rules of state responsibility should apply to breaches of international
obligations committed by the international organization as an independent member of the
international society.
that the responsibility of an international organization is governed by rules which
are parallel to those governing the responsibility of a state).
71 FRIEDRICHBERBER,LEHRBUCHDESVOLKERRECHTS,I.Band 43-44 (2d ed.1975);
C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 190-191 (1958);
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONALLAW 47, § 16 (R. JENNINGs/A. WATTS eds.,
Vol.I, Peace, 9th ed.1992).
72 Meng, supra note 63, at 329.
73 E.g. SHAW, supra note 46, at 63.
74 Albert Bleckmann, Zur Verbindlichkeit des allgemeinen VtJ/kerrechts fir
internationale Organisationen, 37 Z.a.o.R.V. 107, 117-118 (1977). See Meng,
supra note 63, at 332.
7S FELICEMORGENSTERN,LEGALPROBLEMSOF INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS
32 (1986).
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It is furthermore assumed that the rules of state responsibility can be applied to an
international organization by way of analogy.76 Analogy means that a case for which
there are no legal rules is treated in the same way as a similar case for which there are
legal rules. If this approach was accepted, it would be possible to apply the rules of state
responsibility to wrongful acts of the international organization. Yet, this analogy
requires that there are no rules of responsibility for the wrongful acts of the organization.
It is questionable, however, whether this is true because it is argued that the rules of state
responsibility address to all subjects of international law and that the international
organization as a sllbject of international law is also bound by these rules.77
Two objections must be raised against these arguments. First, these rules have evolved
from state practice and are binding only upon states and not to all subjects of
international law.78 Secondly, even if these rules were binding upon all subjects of
international law, the international organization could not contribute to the creation of
these rules. Therefore, the organization would have had no opportunity to object to the
application of these rules to it.79 Thus, its situation can be compared to newly
76 F.V. Garcia Amador, State Responsibility, 1956 II Y.B.Int'l L.Comm'n 173,
189, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/96. See Ginther, supra note 67, at 165. See also
Bleckmann, supra note 74, at 113-115 (saying that analogy exists in international
law and allows an application of customary international law to international
organizations) .
77 BERBER,supra note 65, at 18; Ewa Butkiewicz, The Premises of International
Responsibility of Inter-Governmental Organizations, 11 POLISHYEARBOOKOF
INTERNATIONALLAW(P.Y.I.L.) 117, at 117-118 (1981/82).
78 Cf. Bleckmann, supra note 74, at 110 (saying that the rules of state practice are
only destined to states).
79 Cf. Asylum (Colombia v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277-278 (November 20) and
Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (December 18)
(stating that a customary rule of international law is inapplicable to a state if it
has opposed its application to itself). It is agreed that this protest must be made
continuously by the state from the beginning of the practice in order to prevent
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independent states. In respect to these states the question has been whether they are
bound by the existing customary international law , although they could not have objected
its application to them. The answer to this question depends upon the nature of the
binding force of customary international law. 80If the states can avoid the customary
international law by persistently objecting to it from the start of the custom,81 then it
must be acknowledged that the binding force of customary international law follows from
the express or tacit consent of the states. 82 Therefore, the newly independent states
could prevent the application of customary international law to them by making
reservations83 or be bound by it by way of recognition or acceptance.
the binding force of the rule in question on itself, e.g. SHAW, supra note 46, at
78. But see Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the
Development of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1985).
80 See generally Heintschel v.Heinegg, in VOLKERRECHT,supra note 10, at 197- 199
(giving a survey over the dIfferent opinions on this problem).
81 1951 I.C.J. at 131.
82 Charney, supra note 79, at 16.
83 Walter Rudolf, Neue Staaten und das VOlkerrecht, 17 A.V.R. 1,31 (1976-78);
Milan Sahovic, Influence Des Etats Nouveaux Sur La Conception Du Droit
International, 12 ANNUAIREFRANCAISDE DROITINTERNATIONAL(A.F.D.I.) 30,
34 (1966). See Michael Schweitzer, New States and International Law, in 7
E.P.I.L., HISTORYOF INTERNATIONALAW, FOUNDATIONSANDPRINCIPLESOF
INTERNATIONALLAW, SOURCESOF INTERNATIONALLAW, LAW OF TREATIES
349, 351 (RBernhardt ed., 1984). Contra HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONALAW 313 (1953). See Hans-Jiirgen Schlochauer, Die Entwicklung
des vOlkerrechtlichenDeliktsrechts, 16 A. V. R 239, 241 (1973-75); R FIDELIO
UNGER, VOLKERGEWONHEITSRECHT- OBJEKTIVESRECHT ODER GEFLECHT
BILATERALER BEZIEHUNGEN. SEINE BEDEUTUNG FUR EINEN "PERSISTENT
OBJECTOR"149 (1978).
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This approach is applicable to the international organization. If the international
organization recognizes or accepts the rules of state responsibility as binding for it, there
is no need for an analogy to these rules.
1. Recognition of Rules of State Responsibility
a. Explicit Recognition
It is said that the member states which are bound by the rules of customary international
law intend their international organization to be also bound.84 But this intent must be
found in the constituting treaty because the treaty determines the rights and obligations
of the international organization under international law . These treaties must be reviewed
to see whether they contain explicit recognition of rules of state responsibility.
The constituting treaties of international organizations which contain provisions regarding
the responsibilities of these organizations are the EEC- and the EURATOM -treaties. 85
The EEC-art.215 (1) and the EURATOM-art.188 (1)86 refer to the "contractual
liability" of these organizations. But, since this liability "shall be governed by the law
applicable to the contract in question", these articles deal only with responsibilities for
the wrongful acts in respect to contractual obligations at the national level.
The EEC-art.215 (2) and the EURATOM-art.188 (2) refer to the "non-contractual
liability" of these organizations. However, these provisions state that the liability shall
be determined "in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the
84 Bleckmann, supra note 74, at 117.
85 See supra note 47 for the EEC-treaty; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169 (1958).
86 EEC-treaty, supra note 47, at 86; EURATOM-treaty, supra note 85, at 227. A
similar provision can be found in artAO ECSC-treaty, supra note 47, at 171.
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member states". Thus, it must be concluded that these provisions do not recognize the
rules of state responsibility.
Although no other treaties are found to recogmze explicitly the rules of state
responsibility, it is submitted that an international organization would be bound by these
rules if its constituting treaty contains such a recognition.
b. Implicit Recognition
Even if no explicit recognition of the rules of state responsibility is found in the treaty,
recognition of these rules may be implied. There are several treaties of economic
international organizations which contain provisions that limit the responsibilities of their
member states for obligations of the international organizations to the extent of their
unpaid subscriptions.87 Such limitation of the member states' responsibilities can only
imply - argwnentwn e contrario - that the international organizations are responsible for
obligations which exceed these subscriptions. But the validity of such implied recognition
of responsibility is restricted because the context, object and purpose88 of these
provisions reveal that only contractual, not non-contractual, obligations of the
international organizations are intended. However, the implied recognition of the
responsiblities of international organizations for contractual obligations must be
interpreted as a recognition of the rules of state responsibility, for there are no other
87 See C.F.Amerasinghe, Liability to Third Panies of Member States oflntemational
Organizations: Practice, Principal and Judicial Precedent, 85 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALLAW (A.J.LL.) 259, 271-274, n.42-54 for
references.
88 These are the tools to be used to interprete treaties according to art.31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 54, at 340, which reflects
customary international law , IAN SINCLAIR,THE VIENNACONVENTIONON THE
LAW OF TREATIES19 (2d ed.1984).
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applicable rules. Recognition of responsibility as such is unnecessary due to the fact that
responsibility arises already from a breach of international law.
2. Acceptance of Rules of State Responsibility
a. Explicit Acceptance
The ICI had stated that II (i)t is well recognised that declarations made by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating
legal obligations .... An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to
be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding. 1189 Following that reasoning, then, it is possible for an international
organization to declare its acceptance of the rules of state responsibility by way of an
unilateral act.
The UN has expressly accepted its responsibility for breaches of international law , with
regard to its peace-keeping activities in the Congo.90 Contrary to the recognition of
responsibility included in the constituting treaty, an express acceptance of responsibility
can have two meanings. First, it can mean that there was indeed a breach of international
obligation. Secondly, it can mean that the rules of state responsibility are accepted.
Whereas the first meaning was clearly within the declaration of the UN made by the
89 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.I. 253, 267 (December 20); Nuclear
Tests (New Zealand v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (December 20).
90 See lean I.A.Salmon, Les Accords Spaak-U Thant Du 20 Fevrier 1965, 11
A.F.D.!. 468, 479-480 (1965); Paul de Visscher, Les Conditions D'Application
Des Lois De La Guerre Aux Operations Militaires Des Nations Unies, in 541
ANNUAIREDE L'INSTITUTDE DROITINTERNATIONAL(Session de Zagreb) 1,52-
54 (1971). See also Borhan Amrallah, The International Responsibility of the
United Nations for Activities Carried out by U.N. Peace-Keeping Forces, 32
R.E.D.1. 57 (1976) for the responsibility of the UN for peace-keeping activities.
See generally FREDERICL. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONSIN THEIR
LEGALSETTING716 passim (2d ed.1993) for peace-keeping operations of the UN
and the new developments in this area.
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Secretary-General, the second meaning has not been as clearly accepted. Although the
UN accepted its responsibility for the wrongful acts of its agents,91 hence the rule that
acts of "lent" organs are imputable,92 the agreements concerning the compensation of
damages caused by these acts were only lump-sum agreements.93 The principle of
"restitutio in integrum"94was therefore not accepted.
b.Implicit Acceptance
Even if an international organization does not recognize the rules of state responsibility
in its founding treaty, and even if it does not accept them by way of a declaration, it is
nevertheless bound by these rules by taking part in the international relations without
. declaring reservations.95 Since there is only one set of customary international law
which has evolved from state practice, the participation in international relations without
declaring reservations implies that these rules are accepted. Since the rules of state
91 Although the acts had been committed by military forces of the member states,
these acts were considered to be sole acts of the UN because the forces were
placed under the control of the UN, Roberto Ago, Third Report on State
Responsibility, 1971 IIIl Y.B.Int'1 L.Comm'n 199, 272-274,
U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/246 AND ADD. 1-3. But see Paul de Visscher, Observations
Sur Le Fondement Et La Mise En Oeuvre Du Principe De La Responsabilite De
L 'Organisation Des Nations Unies, 40 REVUEDE DROITINTERNATIONALET DE
DROIT COMPARE165, 169 (1963).
92 Art.9 of the I.L.C. draft on State responsibility, supra note 68, at 31.
93 See Ago, supra note 91. See also de Visscher, supra note 91, at 172 (saying that
this reparation ''foifaitaire'' was due to factual diffculties in ascertaining what
really happened).
94 See The Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Polish Republic) 1928 P.C.I.J.(ser.A)
No.17, 2, 47 (September 13). See generally Ago, supra note 91, at 206 for a
survey of possible legal consequences arising out of breaches of international law .
9S See MORGENSTERN,supra note 75, at 32. Cf BERBER, supra note 71, at 54;
VERDROSS,supra note 64, at 142 (saying that newly independent states are bound
by customary international law if they do not declare reservations).
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responsibility are part of customary international law , the international organization also
accepts them by participating in international relations.
c. Application of Rules of State Responsibility to Public International Organizations
In applying the customary international law to the international organizations, notice
needs to be paid to the differences between the states and the international organizations.
The rules of customary international law can only be applied to the international
organizations as long as they fit the nature of those organizations.96 The following
section will examine how far the rules of state responsibility are applicable to
international organizations.
1. Acts of Organs as Source of Imputability
Art. 13 of the I.L.C. draft on state responsibility specifically refers to "(t)he conduct of
an organ of an international organization acting in that capacity. "97 The commentary of
the I.L.C. reveals that "it would be a mistake to seek in this draft a solution to the
problem of attribution to an international organization of the conduct of organs of that
organization acting on its behalf .... "98 The commentary then points to the cases in
international practice "in which the act of one of its organs has been attributed to an
international organization as a source of international responsibility of the
organization."99 The special rapporteur for the LL.C. draft on state responsibility also
96 Bleckmann, supra note 74, at 120. See HANS-JURGEN MULLER, GRUNDsATZE DER
VOLKERRECHTLICHEN VERANTWORTLICHKEIT INTERNATIONALER
ORGANISATIONEN 87 (1977).
97 I.L.C. draft, supra note 68, at 31.
98 I.L.C. commentary on art. 13, supra note 70, at 90.
99 [d. at 87.
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submits that "(w)here persons who are organs of ... an international organization commit,
in that capacity, ... acts injurious to a third State, the first obvious conclusion is that
those acts involve the responsibility of the ... organization of which the persons in
question are organs. ,,100Hence, art.5 of the I.L.C. draft on state responsibility may
serve as a starting point. Art.5 states that the "conduct of any State organ having that
status under the internal law of that State shall be considered as an act of the State
concerned under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the
case in question. "101
Art.5 refers to the internal law of the state to qualify a person or a group of persons as
organs of that state. In the case of an international organization, reference must be made
to the founding treaty of that organization as its internal law to qualify a person or a
group of persons as organs of the international organization.102These organs act on
behalf of the international organization. It seems thus appropriate to consider the acts of
these organs as acts of the organization,'03provided that "the organ of the international
organization concerned acted in the capacity of an organ of the organization in the
exercise of functions of the organization. ,,104In attributing the acts of organs to an
organization, attention needs to be paid, however, to certain differences in the structure
of state organs and organs of the international organization. The international
100Roberto Ago, Founh Repon on State Responsibility, 1972II Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 71, 127, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/264 AND ADD. 1.
101I.L.C. draft, supra note 68, at 31. See also Ago, supra note 91, at 238-243;
I.L.C. commentary on art.5, in Repon of the Commission to the General
Assembly, 1973II Y.B.lnt'1 L. Comm'n 161, 193, DOC.A/9010/REV.1.
102 See Manuel Perez Gonzalez, Les Organisations Internationales Et Le Droit De
La Responsabilite, 92 R.G.D.I.P. 63, 81 (1988).
103Pernice, supra note 59, at 416. See Amador, supra note 75, at 190.
104I.L.C. commentary on art.l3, supra note 70, at 90.
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organization has generally different kinds of organs with different compositions. 105
Whereas some organs of the international organization are composed of independent civil
servants,106 others are composed of the state representatives.107 Furthermore, the
organs of states or other international organizations may be placed at the disposal of an
international organization, and there may be circumstances where the organs of an
international organization act outside their competences (ultra-vires acts). The impact of
these circumstances on attributing the acts of these organs to an organization will be
clarified next.
a. Organs Composed of Civil Servants
On the one hand, an international organization has administrative organsl08 which are
composed of independent international civil servants. If these organs act in accordance
with their competences provided in the founding treaty, their acts are imputable to that
international organization but to no other subject because of the independent nature of
these organs. 109
105 See SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 143, § 219.
106 See id. at 286-293, § 475-487.
107 See id. at 114-133, § 180-209.
108 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, in HANDBOOK,supra note 3, at 95-100. See generally
A. LERoy BENNETT,INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS,PRINCIPLESANDISSUES
385 passim (4th ed.1988) for the administration of international organizations,
especial Iy the UN.
The Secretary-General of the UN is an example for such an organ.
109Butkiewicz, supra note 77, at 129-130; Pernice, supra note 59, at 416.
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b. Organs Composed of State Representatives
On the other hand, an international organization has plenary and non-plenary organs11O
which are composed of state representatives. It may be asked whether the decisions of
these organs are imputable to the organization or to the member states or to both. There
are two reasons why the decisions of these organs are only imputable to the international
organization.
First, the fact that these organs are composed of states representatives does not make
them organs of every single member state. They are created by the founding treaty as
organs of the organization regardless of their composition. They are independent from
the individual member state, III but are not independent from the member states as a
group. This is because the member states created or joined the organization to be able
to act collectively as a group. They chose to cooperate through the organization which
represents the amalgamation of the member states. It is thus the only entity to which
decisions of these organs are imputable.112 Secondly, on the sociological side, the will
of the organization is a result of dialogues among the state representatives. 113
Therefore, the result will always be different from the will of an individual member
state. There has to be a compromise114 between the state representatives. Although they
110 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, in HANDBOOK,supra note 3, at 81-95. The General
Assembly (hereinafter GA) of the UN is an example for a plenary organ, whereas
the Security Council (hereinafter SC) of the UN is an example of a non-plenary
organ.
III See Christoph Schreuer, Die Bedeutung intemationaler Organisationen im
heutigen VOlkerrecht, 22 A.V.R. 363, 398 (1984).
112 Butkiewicz, supra note 77, at 126; Dupuy, supra note 46, at 543-544.
113 Butkiewicz, supra note 77, at 126; Dupuy, supra note 46, at 544.
114 Seidl-Hohnveldern, in HANDBOOK,supra note 3, at 89.
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are mainly concerned with the interests of their states,115 the state representatives must
also take into account the interests of other member states. This compromise may reflect
different points of view, but it will not be the same as the individual will of a member
state. This is not only true for organizations whose constitutions allow majority decisions,
but also for organizations whose constitutions provide for unanimous decisions because
even then it is unlikely that every will of the individual member states is identical.
There is one exception to this result, however. Because of their status as state
representatives, these representatives function not only as organs of the organization but
also as organs of their respective states. If they act as organs of their states, their acts
are imputable only to their states.116Unless the state representatives declare that they
act in their role as state organs, their acts are imputable only to the international
organization. 117
c. Organs Placed at the Disposal of the Public International Organizations
Art.9 of the I.L.C. draft on state responsibility states that the "conduct of an organ which
has been placed at the disposal of a State by another State or by an international
organization shall be considered as an act of the former State under international law , if
lIS A.J.P.Tammes, Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International
Law, in 94 R.C.A.D.1. 261, 354 (195811).
116SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN/LomL,supra note 2, at 131, Nr 1112. But see MUNCH,
supra note 63, at 264 (arguing that the acts of state representatives are also
imputable to the international organization if they act as organs of their state and
as organs of the international organization. This reasoning must be rejected
because the representatives can only act either as organs of their states or as
organs of the international organization).
117Contra Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Responsibility of Member Sates of an
International Organization for Acts of that Organization, in LE DROIT
INTERNATIONALA L'HEURE DE SA CODIFICATION,ETUDESA L'HoNNEUR DE
ROBERTOAGO, Volume III, 415, 419 (1987).
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that organ was acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the
State at whose disposal it has been placed. ,,118
Art.9 sets forth three conditions119 of imputing the acts of the organ upon the state at
whose disposal it has been placed (beneficiary state): first, the organ must have the legal
status as an organ of the state or international organization which lent it to the beneficiary
state; 120 second, the organ must have acted as if it was an organ of the beneficiary
state; 121 and third, the organ must have acted under the instructions of the beneficiary
state, Le., the beneficiary state must exercise exclusive control over the "lent" organ. 122
The states or international organizations may place an organ at the disposal of an
international organization instead of a state. 123 The acts of this organ are imputable only
to the beneficiary organization, if the above mentioned conditions are fulfilled. 124 The
most decisive criterion in this respect is that of control.125 The acts of the "lent" organ
can only be considered as acts of the beneficiary organization if that organization
controlled the lent organ without any interference from the state or international
118 I.L.C. draft, supra note 68, at 31. See also Ago, supra note 91, at 267-274;
I.L.C. commentary on art.9, in Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly, 1974II/1 Y.B.lnt'l L. Comm'n 157, 286-290, U.N.
Doc.A/961O/REV.1.
119 I.L.C. commentary on art.9, supra note 118, at 286.
120 [d. at 286.
121 [d. at 288.
122 [d. at 287.
123 The military forces of the UN member states are state organs which are placed
at the disposal of the UN for peace-keeping operations, see Ago, supra note 91,
at 272-273.
124 [d.
125 See Eagleton, supra note 66, at 386.
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organization which have lent it.126 Otherwise, the acts of the "lent" organ will be
considered as acts of the lending state or international organization.
d. Organs Acting Ultra-Vires
Art. 10 of the I.L.C. draft on state responsibility states that "(t)he conduct of an organ
of a State .. shall be considered as an act of the State under international law even if, in
the particular case, the organ exceeded its competence according to internal law or
contravened instructions concerning its activity. "127 Art. 10 shows that there is only one
type of ultra-vires acts of state organs, which is when they exceed their competences or
contravene the instructions given to them.
In the case of an international organization we have to differentiate between two types
of ultra-vires acts.128 The first type is when the acts exceed the competences of the
organs129 given by the constituting treaty but remain within the scope of competences
of the international organization. These internal130 ultra-vires acts are similar to those
envisaged by art. 10 of the I.L.C. draft. The second type occurs when the acts of the
126 Butkiewicz, supra note 77, at 124 and at 134; Jean-Pierre Ritter, La Protection
A L'Egard D'Une Organisation Internationale, 8 A.F.D.1. 427,444 (1962). See
Amrallah, supra note 90, at 73-74; de Visscher, supra note 90, at 55-56 for the
UN. See also Perez Gonzalez, supra note 102, at 84.
127 I.L.C. draft, supra note 68, at 31.
128 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20). See
also Philippe Cahier, Les Caracteristiques De La Nullite En Droit International
Et Tout Particulierement Dans La Convention De Vienne De 1969 Sur Le Droit
Des Traitis, 76 R.G.D.I.P. 645, 664 (1972); Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect
of Illegal Acts of International Organizations, in EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD
McNAIR, 88, 111 (1965).
129 See authors in note 128. See infra notes 135 and 136 for examples of such ultra-
vires acts.
130 Terminology used by Lauterpacht, supra note 128, at 111.
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organs exceed the competences of the international organization itself.131These acts are
not within the scope of powers conferred to the international organization in its
constituting treaty. These external ultra-vires acts are not envisaged by art.1O of the
LL.C. draft, since states do not derive their competences from a treaty but already
possess all the possible competences in international law.
Ultra-vires acts are either void ab initio or voidable,132but in both cases they may have
harmful effects on other parties,133regardless of whether they are members or not. 134
Therefore, these acts have to be attributed to someone who will be responsible.
(1) Internal Ultra-Vires Acts
There are basically two kinds of internal ultra-vires acts of organs of an international
organization. The first kind are acts of organs in a field that is conferred to other organs
131See authors in note 128. In its advisory opinion on Reparations for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 LC.J. 174 (April 11), the
Court was asked whether the UN can bring a claim of reparation against a state.
This question concerned the competence of the UN as an organization. The Court
held that the UN has the capacity to claim reparation from a member state, id.
at 184, as well as from a non-member state, id. at 185.
132 See Cahier, supra note 128, at 664. See generally R.Y.Jennings , Nullity and
Effectiveness in International Law, in EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD McNAIR, 64
(1965) on the legal consequences of ultra-vires acts in international law. But see
Ebere Osieke, The Legal Validity of Ultra-Vires Decisions of International
Organizations, 77 A.J.LL. 239 (1983) (favoring a relative nullity of ultra-vires
acts).
133 See Jennings, supra note 132, at 66; Perez Gonzalez, supra note 102, at 78-79.
134The membership may have an influence on the question of which legal effect
should be attached to an ultra-vires act, see Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 411.
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of the international organization.135 The second kind are acts of organs which are not
in conformity with the procedural or substantive rules of the organ concerned. 136
Both kinds of internal ultra-vires acts can be compared to those envisaged by art. 10 of
the I.L.C. draft. Art. 10 also differentiates between two kinds of ultra-vires acts. The first
is that ofan organ exceeding its competences. In this respect, art. 10 refers "to the case
of an organ which acts in the performance of duties other than those which are entrusted
to it." 137 This case is similar to the first kind of internal ultra-vires acts of an
international organization. The second is that of an organ contravening the given
instructions. Here, art. 10 refers "to the case of an organ which, while acting in the
performance of the functions which it was empowered to carry out, acts in a manner
135 See Felice Morgenstern, Legality in International Organizations, 48
BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 241,246-249 (1976-77). In its advisory opinion on Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20), the Court was asked
whether certain expenditures for peace-keeping operations which were authorized
by the GA constituted expenses within the meaning of art. 17(2) UN-Charter,
supra note 2, at 1040. The underlying question was whether the GA, not only the
SC, can authorize peace-keeping operations. This last question concerned the
competence of the GA as an organ of the UN, and it was answered affirmatively
by the Court, id. at 162 passim.
136 Id. at 251-253 on acts contrary to procedural rules. In its advisory opinion on the
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (June 8), the Court was
asked whether the Maritime Safety Committee had been elected in accordance
with art.28(a) of the IMCO Constitution. Art.28(a) provided inter alia that no less
than eight members of the Committee shall be the largest ship owning nations.
Although Liberia and Panama were included among the eight largest ship owning
nations based on registered tonnage, they had not been elected by the IMCO
Assembly into the Committee. Thus, the question was whether the IMCO
Assembly had acted in conformity with the constitution of the IMCO. After an
interpretation of the notion "eight largest ship owning nations", the Court
declared the non-election of Liberia and Panama to be unconstitutional, id. at
171.
137 I.L.C. commentary on art. 10, in Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly, 197511 Y.B.lnt'l L.Comm'n 47,70, U.N.Doc.A/lOOlO/REV.1.
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inconsistent with the instructions, whether general or specific, which had been given to
it. "138 This case is similar to the second kind of internal ultra-vires acts of an
international organization, assuming that the procedural and material rules of an organ
are treated as instructions given to it by the founding treaty. These ultra-vires acts are
imputable to the international organization,139 as are ultra-vires acts of the state organs
to the state according to the rule laid down in art.W of the l.L.C. draft.
(2) External Ultra-Vires Acts
These acts are not similar to those covered by art.W because of the unlimited powers of
states in international law . These acts are distinguishable from the internal ultra-vires acts
. because they are not within the scope of competences of the international organization.
It can be argued that they are not attributable to the international organization because
they are outside the competences of the organization. However, this argument has to be
rejected. As in the case of internal ultra-vires acts, there IS no other subject of
international law to which these acts could be attributed, smce the international
organization is distinct from its members. 140
138Id ..
139 But see Butkiewicz, supra note 77, at 137-139 (differentiating between the ultra-
vires acts of organs composed of civil servants and of organs composed of state
representatives, and submitting that only the ultra-vires acts of organs composed
of civil servants are attributable to the organization, id.).
140 See also Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Legal Personality of International and
Supranational Organizations, 21 R.E.D.l. 35, 44 (1965) (arguing that this result
is based on the estoppel- respectively the bona-fides principle).
35
Because of the implied powers141 of an international organization, only the acts which
are manifestly outside the competence of the organization are ultra-vires.142 It can then
be argued that because of the obvious illegality, the acts concerned should not be
attributed to the organization. In regard to this objection it is worthwile mentioning that
the special rapporteur had proposed an exception to the rule laid down in art.lD for
conduct of an organ if "the organ's lack of competence was manifest. "143 This proposed
exception was rejected by the I.L.C., which observed that "the fact of knowing that the
organ .. is exceeding its competence ... will not enable the victim of such conduct to
escape its harmful consequences. "144 This reasoning must be applied, mutatis mutandis,
to manifest external ultra-vires acts of an international organization .•
2. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Art.22 of the I.L.C. draft states that there is a breach of an "international obligation
concerning the treatment to be accorded to aliens ... only if the aliens concerned have
exhausted the effective local remedies available to them without obtaining the treatment
called for by the obligation or, where that is not possible, an equivalent treatment. "145
141 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 182 (April 11); Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 56 (July 13).
142 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations 1962 I.C.]. 151, at 168 (July 20).
See Lauterpacht, supra note 127, at 108 and 111; Cahier, supra note 127, at 665.
But see Osieke, supra note 131, at 249.
143 Ago, supra note 100, at 95.
144 I.L.C. commentary on art.lD, supra note 137, at 69.
145 I.L.C. draft, supra note 68, at 32.
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The rationale for this principle is that the wrongful act is not completed until the local
remedies are unsuccessfully exhausted.146The state which acted contrary to the
international obligation concerning the treatment of aliens shall have the opportunity to
rectify the created situation by subsequent conduct. 147
Likewise, the responsibility of an international organization for breaches of international
obligations concerning the treatment of aliens is not completed until the aliens concerned
have unsuccessfully exhausted the local remedies of the international organization. An
opportunity should also be given to the international organization to rectify a situation
which is contrary to a specified result required by an international obligation.148
In case of an international organization one major difference has to be taken into account.
The principle of exhaustion of local remedies is most often defined with respect to
situations arising within a state's territory.149Since the international organization does
not have a territory of its own, the breach of an international obligation concerning the
treatment of aliens by the international organization can only occur within the territory
of a member or non-member state.150It is therefore doubtful whether this principle can
be applied to the international organization. The same doubt exists with respect to states.
The question has been whether the principle concerned can be applicable to them if the
initial act of a state occurred outside the state's territory. The special rapporteur
answered the question affirmatively by reasoning that "the only valid criterion for
146Roberto Ago, Sixth Repon on State Responsibility, 1977/1 Y.B.Int'l L.Comm'n
3, 22, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/302 AND ADD. 1-3.
147[d. at 21; I.L.C. commentary on art.22, in Repon of the Commission to the
General Assembly, 1977/2 Y.B.Int'l L.Comm'n 1, 30, U.N.Doc. A/32/1O.
148Amrallah, supra note 90, at 76 for the UN.
149Ago, supra note 146, at 37; I.L.C. commentary on art.22, supra note 147, at 43.
150 See I.L.C. commentary on art.B, supra note 70, at 87.
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determining ... whether the principle of exhaustion of local remedies should or should
not apply is the existence or absence of adequate and effective remedies .... "151 The
I.L.C. agreed with this position by saying that in a situation where effective local
remedies exist "there seems in principle to be no reason why the state should be
prevented from discharging its obligation ... solely on the ground that the initial conduct
was adopted outside its frontiers. ,,152
According to this reasoning the principle of exhaustion of local remedies is applicable
to the international organization if it has effective local remedies.153 A remedy is
effective if it "offer(s) a real prospect of still achieving the result originally aimed at by
the international obligation or, where appropriate, an equivalent result. "154 The remedy
can be "judicial or administrative, ordinary or extraordinary. "155
In the case of the international organization, therefore, two situations have to be
differentiated. First is the breach of an international obligation concerning the treatment
of nationals of member and non-member states (who are aliens for the organization)
outside the internal order of the organization. Second is the breach of such an
international obligation within the internal order of the organization.
151 Ago, supra note 146, at 38.
152 I.L.C. commentary on art.22, supra note 147, at 44.
153 See Ritter, supra note 126, at 454; Fritz Munch, lnternationale Organisationen
mit Hoheitsrechten, in FESTSCHRIFfFORHANSWElIBERG301, 323 (1956).
154 Ago, supra note 146, at 41.
155 ld.
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a. Treatment of Nationals Outside the Internal Orders of Public International
Organizations
(1) Treatment of Nationals of Member States
As a general rule an international organization acts within the territory of a state with the
consent of the latter.156 In this circumstance there is often an agreement concluded
between the state and the international organization which provides inter alia that the
state will be responsible for the wrongful acts of the international organization within the
territory of the state.157 There is no need in such instance for the exhaustion of local
remedies of the international organization.
Sometimes the agreement between the state and the international organization provides
that a remedy will be created to review the wrongful acts of the international
organization.158 As the obligation concerning the treatment of aliens is an obligation
towards the state and not the aliens,159 the state is free to modify this obligation by
creating a remedy that is not already existent. Then, the nationals of the state concerned
have to exhaust the so-created remedy before their state can exercise diplomatic
protection. 160
156I.L.C. commentary on art.B, supra note 70, at 87.
157The technical assistance agreements of the UN contain such provisions, id. at 89;
Zacklin, supra note 66, at 95.
158Amrallah, supra note 90, at 75-76; de Visscher, supra note 90, at 59 for peace
keeping activities of the UN. See also GRENVILLE, CLARKISOHN, LoUIS B.,
WORLD PEACETHROUGHWORLDLAW 331 (2d ed.1960) for actions of the UN
according to Chapter VII.
159Ago, supra note 146, at 31.
160Amrallah, supra note 90, at 76; de Visscher, supra note 90, at 59.
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Yet, there may be wrongful acts of an international organization within a state's territory
without the consent of the state161 or without any agreement between them. If the
international organization has effective local remedies, the nationals of the member state
are obliged to exhaust these remedies. Only if the specified result required by the
international obligation - or an equivalent result - is not achieved, can their state claim
the breach of international obligation against the international organization.
The nationals face the problem, however, that the judicial and administrative bodies of
international organizations are less developed than those of the states.162 They may not
have local remedies. It has been argued, nonetheless, that the principle of exhaustion of
local remedies is applicable, if the international organization subjects itself to a·remedy
. that will be created for the dispute in question or to a remedy that will be available
outside its internal order.163 If this argument were accepted, nationals would have to
negotiate with the international organization which remedy to use or to create. Taking
into account the unequal bargaining power of the parties, this procedure might produce
undue advantages for the international organization. The so-created or agreed remedies
are not effective, if the requirement of an effective remedy is understood in the sense that
it has to be effectively usable.l64 It must therefore be recognized that in cases where
no remedy was available within the internal order of the international organization, the
principle of exhaustion of local remedies does not apply. 165 The state of the nationals
161 This may be the case for actions of the UN pursuant to Chapter VII, see 1.L.c.
commentary on art. 13, supra note 70, at 87.
162 Ritter, supra note 126, at 454.
163 Id.
164 Ago, supra note 146, at 39.
165 See Eagleton, supra note 66, at 352 and at 412; Perez Gonzalez, supra note 102,
at 96.
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concerned can then immediately exercise diplomatic protection against the international
organization.
(2) Treatment of Nationals of Non-Member States Which Recognize the Public
International Organization
Nationals of non-member states which have recognized the international organization166
have to exhaust the effective local remedies of that international organization in case of
a breach of an international obligation concerning the treatment of aliens.167 If the
exhaustion of local remedies does not create a situation in conformity with that
international obligation, or if there are no effective local remedies available within the
internal order of the international organization, the non-member state can exercise
diplomatic protection against the international organization.
(3) Treatment of Nationals of Non-Member States Which do not Recognize the
Public International Organization
Nationals of non-member states which have not recognized the international organization
have also to exhaust the effective local remedies of that organization168 because the
breach of international obligation is not completed until the local remedies are
166 If the organization acts with the state's consent on its territory, this permission
constitutes implicit recognition. In cases where there is an agreement between the
organization and the state, this agreement also constitutes implicit recognition,
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS, supra note 24, at 91.
167 The principle also applies if there is an agreement that provides for the creation
of such remedies. The principle does not apply, however, if there is an agreement
that provides for the exclusive responsibility of the non-member state.
168 The situation where an agreement provides for the exclusive responsibility of the
non-member state or for the creation of local remedies has to be excluded because
such an agreement constitutes an implicit recognition of the organization.
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unsuccessfully exhausted. 169The fact that their state does not recognize the organization
as a subject of international law does not exempt them from that requirement.
However, the non-recognition of the international organization as an international person
unfolds its effects where the exhaustion of local remedies does not bring about the result
required by the international obligation, or where there were no effective local remedies
available within the internal order of the international organization. In that case the state
can "ignore" the international organization170 and does not have to exercise diplomatic
protection against the organization. Instead, the diplomatic protection has to be against
the member states. 171
b. Treatment of Nationals Within the Internal Orders of Public International
Organizations
There are rules which govern the relationship between an international organization and
nationals of member and non-member states who work for the organization (civil
servants).172 Since these rules are enacted on the basis of the founding treaty of the
international organization,173 they are international in character. 174The obligations
of the organization pursuant to these rules are therefore international obligations.175 But
169 Supra note 146.
170See supra text accompanying note 56.
171See infra text accompanying note 287 for the question whether the diplomatic
protection has to be exercised against all member states collectively.
172E.g. SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at 293, § 488.
173SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN/LOIBL,supra note 2, at 123, Nr 1042.
174 Id. at 203-204, Nr 1503.
175 See Amador, supra note 76, at 189.
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these obligations do not exist towards the states whose nationality the civil servants have
(contrary to those obligations concerning the treatment of aliens), but towards the civil
servants.176 Hence, when these obligations are violated, the states of the civil servants
cannot exercise diplomatic protection on their behalf. 177 The requirement of exhausting
the local remedies of the international organization is then unneccessary. The civil
servants can only get protection against such violations by using the administrative or
judicial machinery which is available for them within the internal order of the
international organization.178
3. Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness
The articles 29 - 34 of the I.L.C. draft on state responsibility deal with circumstances
precluding wrongfulness. Only article 34 which deals with self-defense is not applicable
to an international organization, since it does not have a territory that could be the aim
of an armed attack. 179
176 Clive Parry, Some Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in
International Law, in 90 R.C.A.D.1. 653, 716 (195611);Ritter, supra note 126,
at 452.
177 This is also a consequence of the privileges and immunities of the civil servants
towards their own states. But see Ritter, supra note 126, at 452-453.
178 See Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal 1954 I.C.J. 47 (July 13); SCHERMERS,supra note 1, at
296, § 491; SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LomL,supra note 2, at 179, Nr.1351. For
the exhaustion of internal remedies of an international organization by civil
servants see A.A. Cancado Trindade, Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the Law
of International Organizations, 57 R.D.!. 81, 86 (1979). If the organization
disregards the decision of its competent review body, the member states are
entitled to intervene, Ritter, supra note 126, at 452-453. But see Parry, supra
note 176, at 720-721.
179 Art. 51 of the UN-Charter, supra note 2, at 1044-45, to which article 34 of the
I.L.C. draft refers, makes an armed attack an essential condition for self-defense
by a state.
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4. Consequences of a Wrongful Act
The consequence of a wrongful act in international law is the obligation on the part of
the subject who committed the wrong to make reparation or satisfaction. 180
Reparation is due for a material damage. It means to "re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed." 181 If such
a restitution in kind is not possible, the wrongdoer has to pay compensation.182
Satisfaction is due for an immaterial damage. It means normally that the wrongdoer
admits his illegal behaviour and makes a formal excuse. Both reparation and satisfaction
are consequences wbich can be performed by an international organization as well. They
attach therefore to its breaches of international law .
180 E.g. Shaw, supra note 46, at 496; Ipsen, in VOLKERRECHT, supra note 10, at
528. See also Ago, supra note 91, at 206-208 for other concepts of legal
consequences arising out of a wrongful act in international law.
181 The Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Polish Republic) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.A)
No. 17, 2, 47 (September 13).
182 [d. Sometimes monetary compensation is also due for an immaterial damage, see
S.S. "I'm Alone" (United States of America v. Canada), III R.I.A.A. (Willis van
Devanter/Lyman P.Duft) 1609, 1618 (1935).
IV. International Responsibility ofMember States for Wrongful Acts of Their Public
International Organizations
A. Concurrent Responsibility
A member state of an international organization may contribute to the wrongful act of
the organization by its own illegal conduct. If this illegal conduct is associated with the
wrongful act of the international organization, there is a concurrent responsibility of the
international organization and the member state. The responsibility of the member state
is not one for the wrongful act of the international organization, but one for its own
illegal conduct. 183
There is no direct responsibility of the member states for the wrongful acts of the
international organization, because the international organization is an international
person distinct from its members. 184
183 Ritter, supra note 126, at 444-445; Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 117, at 416.
See also MUNCH,supra note 63, at 264 (assuming a responsibility of the member
states for conduct within their international organization). But see Reuter, supra
note 66, at 505 (using the term concurrent responsibility for an indirect
responsibility of the member states for the wrongful acts of their international
organization) .
184 See supra text accompanying note 37. But see Meng, supra note 63, at 342
(arguing that the member states are directly responsible for the ultra-vires acts of
their international organization).
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1. Responsibility for Active Conduct
A member state incurs direct responsibility if it "associated itself with the perpetration,
by an organ of the organization, of an action constituting an internationally wrongful
act." 185
This kind of direct responsibility for an active conduct can occur in association with an
organization's wrongful act within and outside a member state's territory.
2. Responsibility for Omission
A member state incurs direct responsibility if it endorses the wrongful act of an
international organization, or if it does not take all the appropriate measures to prevent
the wrongful act of an international organization.186 Such direct responsibility for
omission can only occur in association with an organization's act within the territory of
a member state, since outside its territory a state has no capacity to prevent illegal
conducts of other subjects of international law.
185 I.L.C. commentary on art. 13, supra note 70, at 91. This would be the case, for
example, if the UN established peace-keeping forces in a state without its consent
and if one of the UN member states agreed to send forces for that purpose.
186 Ago, supra note 100, at 127; I.L.C.-commentary on art. 13, supra note 70, at 91;
Pernice, supra note 59, at 416; Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 117, at 416.
Following the example in note 185, this would be the case if an UN member state
does not prevent the UN peace-keeping forces from making use of its infra
structure for their operations.
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3. Responsibility for Conduct in Association with Binding Decisions of Public
International Organizations
The decisions of an international organization may be binding for the member states.18?
A member state may therefore have an obligation to support or not to prevent the actions
of the international organization. This obligation may conflict with the member state's
obligation not to commit breaches of international law, if the organization's decision
involves an internationally wrongful act. If the member state acts in accordance with the
organization's decision despite its wrongfulness, the state is responsible for its conduct
because the obligation to obey the decisions of the international organization does not
exempt the member state from its responsibility for breaches of international law .188
B. Indirect Responsibility
1. Indirect Responsibility Towards Non-Members Which do not Recognize the Public
International Organization 189
An international organization may violate international rights of a non-member. Since an
international organization is an international person distinct from its members, it is
responsible for its wrongful acts against a non-member. The non-member concerned can
therefore demand reparation or satisfaction from the international organization which
187 See for example art.25 of the UN-Charter, supra note 2, at 1041. See also EVAN
LUARD, INTERNATIONALAGENCIES: THE EMERGINGFRAMEWORKOF
INTERDEPENDENCE288 passim (1977) for techniques of international
organizations to secure compliance with their decisions.
188 F.Miinch, supra note 153, at 322.
189 In the following, reference in this paragraph to a non-member will mean a non-
member which does not recognize the international organization.
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committed the wrongful act. 190 This demand, however, will constitute an implicit
recognition of the organization as a subject of international law .191
However, a non-member is not obliged to address its claims directly to the international
organization unless its bilateral treaty rights have been violated because a treaty between
the non-member and the international organization implies recognition of the organization
as an international person.192 But if the wrongful act was not a breach of bilateral
treaty, the non-member can address its claims directly to the member states of the
organization.193 This is a consequence of the non-recognition of the international
organization. This lack of recognition does not mean that the organization does not exist
as an international person for the non-member, 194 since an international organization
cannot logically violate the international rights of a non-member if it does not exist for
190 Contra Ritter, supra note 126, at 440. See supra text accompanying note 180 for
legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act.
191 See MUNCH, supra note 63, at 256 (assuming that it would theoretically possible
to make such a demand with a reservation of non-recognition).
192 SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,CORPORATIONS,supra note 24, at 91.
193 Matthias Herdegen, Bemerkungen zur Zwangsliquidation und zum
Haftungsdurchgriff bei intemationalen Organisationen, 47 Z.a.o.R. V. 537, 548
(1987); Meng, supra note 63, at 327; F.Miinch, supra note 153, at 322; MUNCH,
supra note 63, at 256; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Die vOlkerrechtliche Haftung
fUr Handlungen intemationaler Organisationen im Verhtiltnis zu
Nichtmitgliedstaaten, 11 6.z.o.R.V. 497, 502-503 (1961). See Ginther, supra
note 67, at 164. See also Ritter, supra note 126, at 436-439 (differentiating
between public and private acts, and assuming that only the former give rise to
a responsibility of the member states). Contra Gerhard Hoffmann, Der Durchgriff
auf die Mitgliedstaaten intemationaler Organisationen fir deren Schulden, 41
NEUE JURISTISCHEWOCHENSCHRIFf(N.J.W.) 585, 586 (1988); Pernice, supra
note 59, at 416. See infra text accompanying notes 286-289 for the question
whether the non-member has to address its claims against all member states
collectively.
194 See supra text accompanying note 55. Contra Meng, supra note 63, at 327.
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the latter.19sThe non-recognition only means that the international personality of the
organization is not opposable to the non-member for purposes of responsibility.l96 It
can therefore "ignore" the international organization by lifting its corporate veil and hold
the member states responsible.l97
Althoughthe non-member can address its claims directly to the member states, it is not
a case of direct responsibility on the part of the member states. It is a case of indirect
responsibility198because the member states are made responsible for the wrongful acts
of their organization which is a distinct international person.l99 The indirect
responsibility of the member states towards a non-member constitutes an exception to the
general rule that the acts of an international organization are only imputable to the
organization. 200
19SIt can be argued that the member states have violated the rights of the non-
member by acting collectively. But it would then not be possible for the non-
member to make the international organization responsible for the wrongful act.
196 See supra text accompanying note 56.
197If the recognition by a nonmember was constitutive for the international
personality of an international organization, there would be no corporate veil to
lift, Meng, supra note 63, at 327.
198MUNCH,supra note 63, at 268; Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 193, at 503 n.32.
199If the recognition by a non-member was constitutive, there would be a direct
responsibility of the member states because the international organization would
not exist for the nonmember. It would have to be assumed, then, that the member
states are made responsible for their acts, see supra note 195.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 97-144.
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2. Indirect Responsibility Towards Non-Members Which Recognize the Public
International Organization 201
If an international organization violates the international rights of a non-member, it is
responsible for this wrongful act because of its independent international personality. Yet,
a non-member cannot address its claims arising out of breaches of international
obligations by the international organization directly to the member states of the
organization202 whereas a non-member which does not recognize the international
organization can do so except for breaches of bilateral treaty. 203 This follows from the
fact that the non-member has recognized the international organization as a subject of
international law distinct from its members. The organization's personality is therefore
opposable to the non-member. Nonetheless the question appears to be whether the
responsibility of an international organization rests solely on that organization or whether
the member states bear an indirect responsibility if the organization cannot or is not
willing to fulfill its primary responsibility.2~
Several arguments have been made in support of an indirect responsibility of the member
states for internationally wrongful acts of their organizations, at least in certain
circumstances. First, it is assumed that the relationship between an international
organization and its member states is similar to that between a federal state and its
members.205 Because of this similarity it is said that the member states of an
201 In the following, reference in this paragraph to a non-member will mean a non-
member which recognizes the international organization.
202 Hoffmann, supra note 193, at 586; Meng, supra note 63, at 342; MULLER,supra
note 97, at 88; MUNCH, supra note 63, at 268; SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN,
CORPORATIONS,supra note 24, at 91.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 192-197.
2~ Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 412.
. 205 MUNCH,supra note 63, at 269-270.
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organization should bear indirect responsibility for the wrongful acts of the organization
as the federal state is responsible for the internationally wrongful acts of its
members.206 However, this comparision speaks for a sole responsibility of an
international organization, since it is the federation which "absorbs" the responsibility of
its members.
Secondly, it is argued that member states are indirectly responsible for the internationally
wrongful acts as far as they control the international organization.207 This argument
does not justify indirect responsibility of the member states, either. 208 If the member
states control the international organization, there is no reason why acts of the
organization should be imputable to the organization and not to the member states. The
theory that an international organization is controlled by its member states destroys de
facto the independent personality of the international organization. It is also a fiction
206 Id.
207 Herdegen, supra note 193, at 552-553; Matthias Herdegen, The Insolvency of
International Organizations and the Legal Position of Creditors: Some
Observations in the Light of the International Tin Council Crisis, 35
NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (N.LL.R.) 135, 142 (1988);
Romana Sadurska/C.M.Chinkin, The Collapse of the International Tin Council:
A Case of State Responsibility ?, 30 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(V.I.LL.) 845, 879-880 (1990). See Perez Gonzalez, supra note 103, at 69.
208 Pernice, supra note 59, at 420.
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because control can only be exercised by one entity209 but not by several entities with
conflicting interests. 210
Thirdly and linked to the first argument, it is submitted that the relationship between an
international organization and its member states is similar to that between a domestic
corporation and its members.211 Because of this similarity, it is said to be possible to
transfer the rules which have been developed by the ICI in the Barcelona Traction
case212 to the international organization.213 Thereby the member states are said to be
responsible for the debts of the international organization if it is terminated214 either by
dissolution or otherwise.
However, the comparision between a domestic corporation and an international
organization has to be rejected. Unlike a domestic corporation an international
209 Not surprisingly, the control theory is based upon a comparision between a state
enterprise and an international organization. The control which is exercised by a
state in a state enterprise allows lifting of the enterprise's corporate veil,
Herdegen, supra note 193, at 552. See generally Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Der
Durchgriff auf den Staat bei Vertrligen im internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehr, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR IGNAZ SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN 17 (1988); Mark M.
Christopher, Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil Between Foreign Governments
and State Enterprises: A Comparision of Judicial Resolutions in Great Britain and
the United States, 25 V.I.LL. 451 (1984-85) for the question when the corporate
veil of a state enterprise can be lifted.
210 See Amerasinghe, supra note 87, at 278.
211 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Der Rilckgriff auf die Mitgliedstaaten in
lntemationalen Organisationen, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR HERMANN MOSLER 881, 887
(1983).
212 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain)
Second Phase, 1970 LC.I. 3 (February 5).
213 Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 211, at 887.
214 ld.
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organization serves public purposes,215 and this excludes the applicability of the rules
for domestic corporations.216 Related to this analogy to domestic law is the argument
that international law does not contain express rules on the limited liability of an
international organization as municipal laws on domestic corporations.217 From the lack
of such rules it is concluded that the limited liability of an international organization is
not possible in international law. 218This approach overlooks the basic principle in
international law that everything is allowed as long as it is not prohibited by a specific
rule.219
Finally, the indirect responsibility of the member states is upheld under the assumption
that there is a general principle of law that no subject can escape its responsibility
towards third parties by creating another subject. 220Yet, it is doubtful whether such a
215Meng, supra note 63, at 331.
216 See Henry G. Schermers, Liability of International Organizations, I LEIDEN
JOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW (L.J.I.L.) 3, 6 (1988) for more criteria of
differentiation between international organizations and domestic corporations.
217H.T.ADAM, LES ORGANISMESINTERNATIONAUXSPECIALISES130 (1965); Meng,
supra note 63, at 331 and 336; Schermers, supra note 216, at 9; Shihata, supra
note 22, at 125.
218Meng, supra note 63, at 336; Schermers, supra note 216, at 9. But see Shihata,
supra note 22, at 125 (saying that the absence of a rule of limited liability does
not imply that there is a rule of unlimited liability).
219 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No. 10, 2, 18-19 (September
7). Pernice, supra note 59, at 419.
220Meng, supra note 63, at 331-333. See Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab
Organization for Industrialization, 23 I.L.M. 1071, at 1084 (International
Chamber of Commerce, Court of Arbitration, 1984) (saying that there is a
general principle of law that members of an organization are indirectly
responsible for the obligations of that organization unless "they had excluded their
liability in a manner which could not escape third parties' notice .... "). See also
Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 193, at 506 (saying that the corporate veil of an
international organization may be lifted in cases which are analogous to those in
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general principle of law can be found in different municipal laws.221 Nevertheless this
argument has to be taken into consideration insofar as it implies that the member states
enabled the international organization to commit breaches of international law by creating
it.222 If they had not created the organization, it would not have an opportunity to
commit an illegal conduct. Because of this creating act the indirect responsibility of the
member states for the internationally wrongful acts of their international organization
cannot totally be excluded.223 This does not mean that the member states incur an
municipal law where lifting of the corporate veil of a domestic corporation is
justified).
221 Amerasinghe, supra note 88, at 274-275; Herdegen, supra note 193, at 551-552,
and supra note 207, at 142. See Pernice, supra note 59, at 418 (saying that the
principle of creditor protection is -if any thing- only applicable to economic
organizations) .
222 See Meng, supra note 63, at 338-339.
223 Contra Pernice, supra note 59, at 419; Ritter, supra note 123, at 436. See
Amerasinghe, supra note 87, at 275-277, and Philippe Cahier, The Strengths and
Weaknesses of International Arbitration Involving a State as a Party, in
CONTEMPORARYPROBLEMSIN INTERNATIONALARBITRATION241, 244 (Julian
DM Lew ed., 1987) (arguing that an indirect responsibility of the member states
of an international organization must be explicitly provided by the founding
treaty) .
In the· International Tin Council case the English Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords denied an indirect responsibility of Great Britain for debts of
the lTC, Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd. v. Department of Trade & Indus. (1988)
3 All E.R. 257; J.H.Rayner Ltd. v. Department of Trade & Indus. (1989) 3
W.L.R. 969. However, the case dealt with the responsibility of the member
states at the national, not international, level. For a discussion of the
case see Amerasinghe, supra note 87, at 260-265; Pierre Michel Eisemann,
Crise Du Conseil International De L 'Etain Et Insolvabilite D 'Une Organisation
Intergouvernementale, 21 A.F.D.!. 730 (1985); P.Sands, The Tin Council
Litigation in the English Courts, 34 N.I.L.R. 367 (1987); Ignaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern, Piercing the Corporate Veil of International Organizations: The
International Tin Council Case in the English Court of Appeals, 32 GERMAN
YEARBOOKOF INTERNATIONALAW 43 (1989). See also Eric J.McFadden,
The Collapse of Tin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity Agreement, 80
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unlimited indirect responsibility. 224 This would be a denial of the independent legal
personality of the international organization.225 The indirect responsibility of the
member states must therefore be an exception.226
a. Indirect Responsibility for Ultra-Vires Acts
Ultra-vires acts may not only be breaches of an international organization's internal law ,
but may also constitute wrongful acts towards non-members. It can be argued in such an
instance that the member states bear an indirect responsibility for these acts, since they
run afoul the constituting treaty of the organization which was set up by the member
states. Thus, the indirect responsibility of the member states may arise from the fact that
. the international organization did not act within the limits imposed by them.227
However, it is questionable whether a non-member whose rights have been violated can
invoke indirect responsibility of the member states based on this fact. A differentiation
between the internal and the external ultra-vires acts seems necessary for resolving the
Issue.
A.J.I.L. 811 (1986) for the economic background.
224 Herdegen, supra note 193, at 553-554, and supra note 207, at 142; MUNCH,
supra note 63, at 268; SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN/LoIBL,supra note 2, at 80, Nr
0709. Contra Meng, supra note 63, at 340. See MULLER, supra note 97, at 88.
225 See Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 413; PIERRE-MARIE Dupuy, LA
REsPONSABILITEINTERNATIONALEDES ETATSPOURLES DOMMAGESD'ORIGINE
TECHNOLOGIQUEET INDUSTRIELLE66 (1976).
226 Hoffmann, supra note 193, at 586.
217 But see Meng, supra note 63, at 342 (arguing that the responsibility of the
member states for the ultra-vires acts is a direct responsibility based upon their
control over the international organization).
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(1) Internal Ultra-Vires Acts
The internal ultra-vires acts are those which are contrary to the internal separation of
powers between the organs or to the procedural and substantive rules of the organs of an
international organization.228 But they are nonetheless within the organization's scope
of competences. A non-member's expectation that the international organization will obey
its internal law does not need to be protected because the organization's nonconformity
with its internal rules is an exclusively internal matter of the organization.229 Moreover,
this nonconformity does not aggravate the wrongfulness of the act. For the non-member,
it makes no difference whether the act was in conformity with the organization's internal
law or not. There is therefore no indirect responsibility of the member states for the
internal ultra-vires acts of their organization.
(2) External Ultra-Vires Acts
The external ultra-vires acts are those which are outside the international organization's
scope of competences.230 As in the case of internal ultra-vires acts, the nonconformity
of the external ultra-vires acts with the organization's constituting treaty does not add
anything to its wrongfulness. But contrary to the internal ultra-vires acts, this
nonconformity is not an exclusively internal matter of the international organization. It
concerns the external sphere of the organization, since these acts exceed the competences
which relate to the organization's external activities. Hence, the belief of a non-member
228 See supra text accompanying notes 135-139.
229 Art. 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations and Between International Organizations, supra note
8, at 570, excludes in principle an organization's recourse in its internal law.
Since an organization cannot invoke its internal law towards other parties, it must
be concluded- argumentum e contrario - that other parties cannot invoke the
internal law of an international organization either.
230 See supra text accompanying note 140.
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that the international organization will not go beyond its external competences demands
more attention. Under normal circumstances, the international organization would not be
able to perform such an act in its external relations. Thus, it is reasonable to protect a
non-member in its belief that it will not be violated by the external ultra-vires acts of the
organization by stipulating an indirect responsibility of the member states. The member
states will incur this indirect responsibility if the international organization is unable or
unwilling to undertake its responsibility for wrongful acts.
However, there is one difficulty with this point of view. This difficulty stems from the
implied powers of an international organization. These are "those powers which, though
not expressly provided in the charter, are conferred upon (the international organization)
by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. ,,231These
powers may lead to the conclusion that the acts which seem at first sight to be external
ultra-vires acts are still within the organization's scope of competences because they are
essential to the performance of its duties. Nevertheless, these implied powers do not
expand an organization's external competences unlimitedly.232These powers must be
necessary to achieve the aims of the international organization,233and if they are not
necessary, the acts are ultra-vires, and the member states are indirectly responsible for
them.
231Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 182 (April 11).
232Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 140, at 40.
233 [d.
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b. Indirect Responsibility for Ultra-Hazardous Activities
(1) Conventional Rules on Indirect Responsibility for Ultra-Hazardous Activities
Art.22 (3) of the Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects234 (hereinafter Liability Convention) provides that an international organization
and its member states which are parties to the Liability Convention are jointly and
severally liable for damages caused by outer space activities of that organization. Before
this joint and several liability can be established, two conditions must be met according
to art.22 (1): the international organization must have declared its acceptance of the
rights and obligations of the Liability Convention, and a majority of the international
organization's member states must be parties to the Liability Convention and to the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty).235
By establishing that the international organization and their member states are jointly and
severally liable, the Liability Convention provides that the member states are indirectly
responsible for the acts of the organization. Yet, only those member states which are
parties to the Liability Convention incur this indirect responsibility. This is an exception
to the afore mentioned submission that in a case of indirect responsibility all member
states are indirectly responsible.236 This exception can be explained by referring to the
customary rule of international law that a treaty cannot impose any obligation upon third
234March 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 193 (1975). See generally Olivier Deleau,
La Convention Sur La Responsabilite Pour Les Dommages Causes Par Des Objets
Spatiaux, 17 A.F.D.I. 876 (1971); W.F.Foster, The Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 10 THE CANADIANYEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONALAW (C. Y.I.L.) 137 (1972) for a discussion of the Liability
Convention.
235January 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S 205 (1967).
236 See supra text accompanying notes 222-226.
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parties unless they have consented to that obligation.237 The declaration of acceptance
by the international organization required by art.22 (1) cannot be construed as binding
for its member states238 because of its independent international personality. Therefore,
the Liability Convention could only stipulate an indirect responsibility of those member
states which are parties to it.
The reason for an indirect responsibility of those member states which are parties to the
Liability Convention is supposedly that the outer space activities involve an increased
danger of harm.239 For the same reason, art.2 of the Liability Convention240 has
established an absolute liability for the damages caused on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight. That means that the parties to the Liability Convention are liable for
any act which causes the kind of damage prescribed by art.2. The concept of this
absolute liability is an exception to the rules of state responsibility, since it does not
require that the act which leads to liability is in breach of an international obligation.241
237 See supra note 54.
238 Kay Hailbronner, Liabilityfor Damage Caused by Spacecraft, 30 Z.a.o.R.V. 125,
132-133 (1970).
239 Id.
240 Supra note 234, at 189.
241 N.L.J.T. Horbach, The Confusion About State Responsibility and International
Liability, 4 L.J.LL. 47, 51-53 (1991). This is the reason why the LL.C. decided
to prepare a different draft on liability, id. See Daniel B. Magraw, Transboundary
Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of "International Liability", 80
A.J.LL. 305 (1986) and Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International
Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law:
A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INTERNATIONALAND COMPARATIVELAW
QUARTERLY(LC.L.Q.) 1 (1990) for an evaluation of the LL.C. draft on
international liability.
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It only requires that the act causes damage.242 Yet, the absolute liability envisaged by
the Liability Convention is limited, since art.3243 provides for a liability based on fault
for damages done elsewhere than on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight.
The indirect responsibility of the member states is a secondary responsibility because
according to art.22 (3) (a) a claim for compensation shall be first presented to the
international organization. Pursuant to art.22 (3) (b) a non-member state may invoke the
member states' responsibility only if the international organization does not fulfill its
obligation within six months. 244
242 Walter Rudolf, Haftung fUr rechtmtijJiges Verhalten im VOikerrecht, in
FESTSCHRIFfFUROTTOMUHL 535, 539 (1981).
243 Supra note 234, at 190.
244 Art.22 (3) covers only damages done to states, not to other subjects of
international law . That is why this part of the thesis refers only to non-member
states instead of non-members. The solution of the secondary indirect
responsibility of those member states which are parties to the Liability Convention
does not apply to non-member states which do not recognize the international
organization, I.H. Diederiks-Verschoor, Pro and Contra of International
Governmental Organizations in Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SEVENTEENTHCOLLOQUIUMON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 186, 188 (1975)
(hereinafter PROCEEDINGS);Christian Patermann, Interpretation of some Articles
of the Convention on International Liabilityfor Damage Caused by Space Objects,
in PROCEEDINGS118, 120 (1973); Silvia Maureen Williams, Remarks on some
Aspects of Space Liability, in PROCEEDINGS274, 277 (1972). Their participation
in a multilateral treaty does not imply recognition of the organization's
international personality contrary to a bilateral treaty between them. Non-member
states which do not recognize the international organization can therefore present
their claims directly to the member states. But contrary to what was said above,
supra text accompanying note 193, they cannot present their claims to all member
states. They can present their claim only to those member states which are parties
to the Liability Convention, Patermann, at 121, because member states which
have not ratified the Liability Convention are not bound by the principle of
absolute liability. Hence, these member states do not bear an indirect
responsibility. It can be argued that this result might be an incentive for member
states of an international organization which has declared its acceptance of the
rights and obligations of the Liability Convention not to ratify this Convention
and thereby avoid indirect responsibility. But it should be recalled that an
I
I
I
I
I
i
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A similar provision can be found in the Outer Space Treaty. Its art.6245provides that
the "responsibility for compliance with this treaty shall be borne both by the international
organization and by the states parties to the treaty participating in such organization." By
providing that the member states of an international organization are responsible for the
organization's compliance with the Outer Space Treaty, it establishes an indirect
responsibility of the member states. As in the Liability Convention, only those member
states parties to the Outer Space Treaty bear an indirect responsibility. This limitation of
indirect responsibility to certain member states is based on the same reason as in the
Liability Convention.
Art.6 does not say, however, whether a claim for compensation has to be first presented
to the international organization or whether a non-member state can choose to present its
claim first to the member states. The provision can possibly be interpreted in both
ways.246Yet, following the general submission that an international organization is
primarily responsible towards a non-member,247the non-member state has to present
its claim first to the international organization. Only if the organization does not fulfill
its obligation is a non-member state entitled to address its claim to the member states.
The indirect responsibility of those member states parties to the Outer Space Treaty is
therefore a secondary one.248It is assumed that the indirect responsibility of those
international organization is only able to adhere to this Convention if a majority
of its member states has ratified it.
245Supra note 235, at 209.
246Zdzislaw Galicki, Liability of International Organizations for Space Activities, 5
P.Y.I.L. 199, 203 (1972-73).
247 See supra text accompanying note 202.
248A non-member state which does not recognize the international organization can
present its claim directly to the member states, Williams, supra note 244, at 274.
However, only those member states which are parties to the Outer Space Treaty
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member states is established because of the increased risk of damage involved in outer
space activities.
Art.7249 of the Outer Space Treaty provides that parties to the Treaty are "liable for
damage to another state party to the treaty or to its natural or juridicial persons," thereby
establishing an absolute liability, 250 since it does not limit the liability to fault but
embraces every damage. The reason why the Outer Space Treaty is not as specific as the
Liability Convention is about the liability of an international organization and its member
states is probably that there have been already discussions within the legal Sub-
Committee of the UN- Committee on the peaceful use of outer space about the drafting
of the Liability Convention.251
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies252 (hereinafter Agreement) does not contain a provision dealing with an indirect
responsibility of the member states. Art.16 in combination with art.14253 of the
Agreement establishes only a responsibility of the international organization itself. An
bear an indirect responsibility, since the other member states are not bound by its
concept of absolute liability. See infra note 250 for the concept of absolute
liability.
249 Supra note 235, at 209. Since art.7 covers only damages done to states, this part
of the thesis refers only to non-member states instead of non-members.
250 Rudolf, supra note 242, at 537-538. Contra Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Legal
Aspects of Space Activities by Private Enterprises, in PROCEEDINGS 234, 238
(1977).
251 See Gerald F. FitzGerald, The Participation of International Organizations in the
Proposed International Agreement on Liability for Damage Caused by Objects
Launched into Outer Space, 3 C.Y.I.L. 265 (1965) for the drafting history of
art.22 of the Liability Convention.
252 December 18, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979).
253 Id. at 1439-1440
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explanation for that omission can be found in art. 14 (2) which says that the "detailed
arrangements concerning liability for damage caused on the moon.... may become
necessary as a result of more extensive activities on the moon. II Thus, a detailed
provision on liability was considered unnecessary because of the limited activities on the
moon. Moreover, since the moon and other celestial bodies do not belong to anyone
country, the activities on these celestial bodies cannot cause damage to any country. The
Agreement is therefore no evidence for a tendency towards sole liability of international
organizations in the sphere of outer space activities.254
(2) Customary Rules on Indirect Responsibility for Ultra-Hazardous Activities
The Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention provide for an indirect
responsibility of those member states which have adhered to them for the outer space
activities of their international organizations. The justification for such an indirect
responsibility lies in the greater risk of damage of such activities compared to normal
activities. A transfer of this concept of indirect responsibility to other ultra-hazardous
activities of international organizations presupposes that there is an absolute liability in
international law for damages arising out of ultra-hazardous activities. However, it is
doubtful whether there is a customary rule or a general principle of international law
which prescribes an absolute liability for ultra-hazardous activities.255 Yet, if there was
254 But see Pernice, supra note 59, at 422.
255 See C.Wilfred Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International
Law, in 117 R.C.A.D.l. 99, 176 passim (19661) and John M. Kelson, State
Responsibility and the Abnormal Dangerous Activity, 13H.I.L.J. 197,233 passim
(1972) (arguing in favor of such a rule). But see Eduardo Jimenez De Arechaga,
International Law in the Past Third of a Century, in 159 R.C.A.D.l. 1, 273
(19781); BOckstiegel, supra note 250, at 238; Dupuy, supra note 225, at 210;
Rudolf, supra note 242, at 544 (arguing against such a rule). See also Albrecht
Randelzhofer, Probleme der volkerrrechtlichen Geftihrdungshaftung, 24BERICHTE
DERDEUTSCHENGESELLSCHAFfFURVOLKERRECHT35, 66 (1984) (saying that
63
such a rule or a principle,256 the idea of indirect responsibility of the member states of
an international organization which engages in such activities could be applied to those
ultra-hazardous activities as well. 257
3. Indirect Responsibility Towards Other Member States
The member states of an international organization have two different kinds of relations
with that organization: internal and external relations. If the international organization
violates the rights of a member state, the external relation between the organization and
the member state is involved. In such a case, the member state is in the same position
as a non-member which has recognized the international organization.258 Therefore the
same solution which applies to such a non-member has to be applied here.259 This
means that the international organization is primarily responsible for its wrongful act
towards a member state. The other member states incur an indirect responsibility only
even in those areas of ultra-hazardous activities where an absolute liability was
established by treaties, there is no customary rule of absolute liability because of
a missing opinio iuris).
256Such a rule exists arguably in the environmental area, Julio Barboza, Sixth Repon
on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not
Prohibited by International Law, 1990 11/1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 83, 96,
U.N.Doc. A/CNAI 428 and Add. 1. See also Arechaga, supra note 255, at 272;
and Rudolf, supra note 242, at 544 (discussing a rule of absolute liability
especially with respect to the environment).
2S7Herdegen, supra note 193, at 554. See L.F.E. Goldie, International Principles
of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
283, 328-329 (1970).
258MUNCH, supra note 63, at 270. The membership of a state within an international
organization is only of importance within the internal order of that organization,
id. at 270-271.
259 Contra F. Munch, supra note 153, at 318.
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in case of an external ultra-vires act or an ultra-hazardous activity for which international
law has established an absolute liability. 260
However, since the constituting treaty of an international organization is lex specialis for
the member states, 261it can provide for another solution with respect to the question
of indirect responsibility. The founding treaty can establish an unlimited indirect
responsibility of the member states or a limited responsibility of the international
organization for its breaches of international law towards its member states. There are
a number of treaties of financial international organizations which contain non-liability
clauses.262 These clauses exclude the liability of member states for obligations of their
organizations beyond the extent of their unpaid subscriptions,263 thereby restricting the
260 But see Adrian Buckling, Die vOlkerrechtliche Haftung Jilr Schtiden, die durch
Weltraumgegenstlinde verursacht werden, 21 ZEITSCHRIFfFORLUFfRECHTUND
WELTRAUMRECHTSFRAGEN213,219 (1972) (saying that art. 22 (3) of the Liability
Convention does not cover damages done by an international organization to its
member states. However, there is nothing in the Convention which excludes such
damages from its scope).
261Ritter, supra note 126, at 433. See Herdegen, supra note 193, at 549.
262 See Amerasinghe, supra note 87, at 271-274 n. 42-54 for references.
263The payments of the member states for their uncalled subscriptions is not an
indirect responsibility, since these payments are made towards the international
organization and not towards the creditor of the organization, MUNCH, supra note
63, at 263-64. In the case of Eurochemic, an international enterprise which was
dissolved, the member states made payments for the contractual obligations of
Eurochemic to Belgium, the successor of the enterprise, as part of the winding
up process, but not to the creditors of the enterprise, Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra
note 223, at 51-52. The fact that the payments went beyond the subscribed shares
of the member states, id., can be explained on the ground that the Statute of
Eurochemic did not contain any non-liability clause, Amerasinghe, supra note 87,
at 271.
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indirect responsibility of the member states towards another member state.264However,
the impact of these non-liability clauses is limited even with regard to the member states,
since the interpretation pursuant to art.31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,265which reflects customary international law, shows that these clauses are
only destined to contractual, but not to non-contractual, obligations of an international
organization. Yet, these clauses restrict the indirect repsonsibility of other member states
with respect to the contractual obligations of an international organization towards a
member state.
4. Division of Indirect Responsibility Among Member States
a. Attribution of Indirect Responsibility to Member States
(1) Wrongful Acts Towards Non-Members 266
Two situations have to be differentiated depending on where the act which gives rise to
the indirect responsibility of the member states has occured. First, if the act occured in
the territory of a non-member state, the indirect responsibility has to be attributed to all
member states collectively because there is no link to a particular member state which
264These clauses have no effect on non-members which do not recognize the
international organization. These clauses are also without effect on non-members
which recognize the international organization. The recognition does not mean
that the non-members consent to the limitation of the indirect responsibility of the
member states which is a question of the internal law of the organization. If the
member states want to exclude their indirect responsibility towards these non-
members, they have to conclude a treaty with these non-members on that issue,
Meng, supra note 63, at 340. Contra Amerasinghe, supra note 87, at 272-73. See
Hoffmann, supra note 193, at 587 (saying that the non-liability clauses have an
effect for contracts between a non-member state and an international
organization) .
265 Supra note 54, at 340.
266The following remarks are valid for all non-members - whether they recognized
the international organization or not.
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would allow attribution of indirect responsibility to this particular state.267 Second, if
the act occured in the territory of a member state, it can be argued that the indirect
responsibility should be attributed to this particular state because of the territorial link
between the act and the state. 268
The fact that some headquarter agreements provide that the seatstate of the international
organization does not incur any additional responsibility for the acts of the organization
other than that which follows from its membership269 seems to support this argument.
Such a provision, which is only binding for the member states,270would be unnecessary
if the territorial link was considered to be irrelevant by the member states. However, the
attribution of the indirect responsibility to the member state where the act occured
conflicts with art. 13 of the I.L.C. draft on state responsibility, which states that "(t)he
conduct of an organ of an international organization ... shall not be considered as an act
of a State ... by reason only of the fact that such conduct has taken place in the territory
of that State .... ,,271Yet, it has to be admitted that the practice which has been taken
267MONCH, supra note 63, at 267.
268 Id. at 266. See L.F.E. Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive
Development of International Law, 14 I.C.L.Q. 1189, 1253 (1965) and SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN/LomL, supra note 2, at 80, Nr 0707 with respect to a non-
member state which does not recognize the international organization. See also
F.Miinch, supra note 153, at 322 (assuming an indirect responsibility of such a
state for non-treaty breaches with respect to every non-member state - regardless
of recognition) and Ritter, supra note 126, at 438 (assuming an indirect
responsibility of such a state for public acts with respect to a non-member state
which does not recognize the international organization).
269 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 117, at 418 for a headquarter agreement of
the Republic of Austria. Such a provision is useful for the seats tate because it is
most likely that the acts of the international organization occur on its territory.
270 Id.
271Supra note 68, at 31.
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into account by the I.L.c. to draft art.l3 consists only of cases between an international
organization and its member states or non-member states which recognize the
international organization.272 Nonetheless it is submitted that the reasoning behind
art.l3 applies also to a non-member which does not recognize the organization. The mere
fact that the act which gives rise to the indirect responsibility of the member states
occured in the territory of a member state is not sufficient to single out this particular
state. The territorial link between this particular state and the act concerned is only
arbitrarily. There is no more causal relationship between the act and the particular state
than between the act and the other member states. Therefore, even if the act is committed
in the territory of a member state, the indirect responsibility has to be attributed to all
member states collectively. 273
The attribution of the indirect responsibility to all member states collectively may be
challenged for acts which have been decided by a majority. It can be said that only those
member states which have voted in favor of the act should be indirectly responsible. This
is contrary to the general rule that the acts of an international organization are only
imputable to the organization.274 However, since the indirect responsibility of the
member states is an exception to that general rule, it can be further argued that the
indirect responsibility of only those member states which voted for the act also follows
from that exception. Still, the assumption has no validity, since an opposing member
state has agreed to the possibility of majority decisions within the organization. Since the
state knew that its vote could be overruled, it cannot escape the indirect responsibility
272 See the I.L.C. commentary on art.l3, supra note 70, at 87 passim.
273 Cf MONcH, supra note 63, at 267 (assuming a collective responsibility of all
member states, but submitting that the member state on whose territory the act
was committed bears a primary responsibility, whereas the other member states
bear a secondary responsibility).
274 See supra text accompanying notes 97-144.
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as a member of that organization.275 Thus, even in the case of majority decisions all
member states are held indirectly responsible.
(2) Wrongful Acts Towards Member States
Here again we are faced with two different situations depending on the location of the
act which gives rise to the indirect responsibility of the member states. First, if the act
occured in the territory of the claimant member state or a non-member state, the indirect
responsibility has to be attributed to all other member states collectively, since there is
no link to a particular member state which would justify attribution of indirect
responsibility to this particular state. Second, if the act occured in the territory of one of
the other member states, the indirect responsibility has to be also attributed to all member
states collectively except for the claimant member state because the territorial link
between the act and the particular member state is of no importance. 276
b. Share of Responsibility
Although the indirect responsibility is attributed to all member states collectively, the
question remains whether a claimant subject has to receive reparation from all member
states collectively, or whether it can receive reparation from one member state.277 The
275 Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 193, at 503. See F.Miinch, supra note 153, at
322.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 272-273. Those member states which voted
against the act are also indirectly responsible because of their consent to majority
decisions, see supra text accompanying note 275.
277 See Wilhelm A. Kewenig, Der Internationale Zinnrat - Ein Lehrstiick des
WinschaftsvtJlkerrechts, 36 RECHT DER INTERNA TIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 781, 786
(1990). The same question arises with respect to the exercise of diplomatic
protection by a non-member state which does not recognize the international
organization, see supra note 171.
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former presupposes that the member states are only partly liable, whereas the latter
presupposes that the member states are jointly and severally liable.
Art.22 (3) of the Liability Convention278provides that the "organisation and those of
its members which are States Parties to this convention shall be jointly and severally
liable. II Yet, it is doubtful whether this means a joint and several liability of the member
states. The wording of art.22 (3) permits the assumption that the organization on one side
and the member states en bloc on the other side are jointly and severally liabile.279This
interpretation is supported by the context of the convention.280Art.5 (1)281establishes
a joint and several liability of two or more launching states. Persuant to art.5 (2)282the
state which has paid compensation has a claim of indemnification against the other
. launching state(s). Such a provision is missing in art.22 (3). Even if art.22 (3) was
interpreted in such a way as to make the member states of an international organization,
which are parties to the Liability Convention, jointly and severally liable, this principle
would only attach to this Convention.
To apply this principle also in other cases which are not related to the Liability
Convention, it would have to be shown that the principle of joint and several liability is
either a customary rule of international law or a general principle of law. There is no
278Supra note 234.
279Patermann, supra note 244, at 121-22. See Foster, supra note 234, at 182 and
Galicki, supra note 246, at 207. But see FitzGerald, supra note 251, at 247-75
(citing suggestions in the legal Sub-Committee that prepared the Liability
Convention for a joint and several liability of the member states of an
international organization). See also Goldie, supra note 268, at 1253 (suggesting
a joint and several liability of states that engage in space activities through
international organizations).
280Patermann, supra note 244, at 121-122.
281Supra note 234, at 190.
282 Id ..
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sufficient practice which would allow the assertion that the principle is a customary
rule.283 However, there is support for the submission that the principle of joint and
several liability is a general principle of law.284 The principle of joint and several
liability is established in the common and civil law systems for torts that are committed
by several parties.285 Other law systems have also embraced this principle.286 It is
therefore assumed that the principle of joint and several liability is a principle of
international law. Thus, the member states of an international organization are jointly and
severally liable for acts of their organization which entail their indirect responsibility.
Accordingly, a claimant subject can present its total claim for reparation to one member
state. 287
Once the member state has satisfied the claim of the claimant subject, it has a claim of
indemnification towards the other member states.288 This claim of indemnification has
to be satisfied by each member state according to the percentage of its amount of
283 John E. Noyesl Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint
and Several Liability, 13THEYALEJOURNALOFINTERNATIONALLAW225, 242
passim, 250 (1988). But see Meng, supra note 63, at 342; MUNCH,supra note
63, at 267 and Ritter, supra note 126, at 436 (assuming a joint and several
liability of the member states of an international organization). See also Paul de
Visscher, La Protection Diplomatiques Des Personnes Morales, in 102
R.C.A.D.1. 480, 487-88 (19611) (assuming that the member states of the EEC
can act ut singuli towards a non-member state which does not recognize the EEC
to protect its interests. That means - argumentum e contrario - that such a non-
member state can invoke its claim against one member state).
284 Noyesl Smith, supra note 283, at 249 passim.
285 [d. at 251.
286 Id. at 252-53.
287 The same principle applies to the exercise of diplomatic protection by a non-
member state which does not recognize the international organization.
288 MUNCH,supra note 63, at 268; F. Munch, supra note 153, at 323.
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financial contribution to the international organization or its subscribed shares of the
international organization.
V. Summary of Conclusions
An international organization comes into being by an international agreement concluded
by subjects of international law, i.e., states or other international organizations.289 This
international organization is called a public international organization instead of
international governmental organization, since it is assumed that not only states but also
international organizations can create such an international organization. The founding
agreement must make the international legal system available for the organization, it must
provide for the aims and related competences of the organization, and it must equip the
organization with its own organs.29O If these requirements are fulfilled, the international
organization is distinct from its founders.
By receiving international rights and obligations, an international organization becomes
an international person. The source of this international personality is the agreement by
which the organization is established.291 The international personality of an organization
is thereby restricted to the rights and obligations which are imposed by the founding
treaty. This makes an international organization different from a state whose international
personality is independent from any international treaty and whose rights under
international law are unlimited.
289 Supra text accompanying notes 3-9.
290 Supra text accompanying notes 10-17.
291 Supra text accompanying note 46.
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Once an international organization has been established, it exists as an international
person for all subjects of international law , whether they recognize the organization or
not. 292
The international personality is, however, not opposable to subjects which do not
recognize the organization because of the principle "res inter alios acta" .293 Otherwise,
these subjects would be obliged to accept the responsibility of the organization for its
wrongful acts. This would be contrary to the afore mentioned principle. If the
organization is recognized by other subjects, its international personality is opposable to
these subjects. The recognition by other subjects of international law does not confer a
new personality to the organization. Thus, its personality is objective and a recognition
of its personality is declarative. 294
Since an international organization has rights and obligations under international law , it
is able to act under international law . Therefore it can violate the rights of other subjects
of international law because the capacity to act entails the capacity to act illegally. When
acting illegally under international law, an international organization is responsible for
its breaches of international law. 295 However, there are no rules of international
responsibility developed by the practice of international organizations which govern the
international responsibility of these organizations. There are only rules of state
responsibility developed by state practice.296 These rules are not per se binding for an
292 Supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
293 Supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
294 Supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
295 Supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
296 Supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
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international organization.297 But they are binding for the organization, if the
organization recognizes or accepts them, or if it participates in the international relations
without declaring reservations.298 However, in applying these rules to the organization
due respect needs to be paid to its structure.
An international organization is responsible for the acts of its organs, whether these
organs are composed of civil servants or of state representatives.299 It is also
responsible for the acts of the organs which have been placed at its disposal from states
or other international organizations.300 Finally, the ultra-vires acts of its organs,
whether internal or external, are imputable to the organization. 301 The responsibility
for all these acts is a consequence of the independent international personality of an
international organization.
If an international organization breaches international obligations concerning the
treatment to be accorded to aliens, those individuals have to exhaust the local remedies
of the organization, provided that there are such remedies available and that they are
effective.302 If the exhaustion of these remedies does not lead to a situation required by
the international obligation, or if there are no effective remedies available within the
internal order of the organization, the states of the individuals concerned, which are
members of the organization or which recognize the organization, can exercise diplomatic
297 Supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
298 Supra text accompanying notes 84-95.
299 Supra text accompanying notes 96-117.
300 Supra text accompanying notes 118-126.
301 Supra text accompanying notes 127-144.
302 Supra text accompanying notes 148-169.
--,
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protection against the organization.303 But, those states which do not recognize the
organization can exercise diplomatic protection directly against the member states of the
organization as a consequence of their non-recognition.304
If a member state acts in association with an organization, it is responsible for its own
conduct. 305 This tyPe of responsibility is called concurrent responsibility. There is no
direct responsibility of the member states for acts of an organization, since the
international organization is a subject of international law distinct from its members.
However, the member states incur an indirect responsibility in certain circumstances.
They incur an indirect responsibility for all kinds of acts towards subjects which do not
recognize the organization.306 The practical consequences of this unlimited
responsibility towards subjects which do not recognize the international organization are
restricted, since all the major international organizations are recognized by the majority
of the subjects which form the international community.
The member states of an organization incur only a limited indirect responsibility towards
subjects which recognize the organization.307 This indirect responsibility is limited to
the external ultra-vires acts of their organization308 and to its ultra-hazardous activities
for which international law has established an absolute liability. 309 The practical
consequences of this limited responsibility towards subjects which recognize the
303 Supra text accompanying notes 161-167.
304 Supra text accompanying notes 170-171.
30S Supra text accompanying notes 185-188.
306 Supra text accompanying notes 192-200.
307 Supra text accompanying notes 222-226.
308 Supra text accompanying notes 230-233.
309 Supra text accompanying notes 234-257.
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international organization are equally restricted. First, external ultra-vires acts are
unlikely to occur because of the implied powers of an international organization.310
Second, the areas in which conventional and customary international law have established
an absolute liability are limited. 3\1
The same indirect responsibility of the member states applies to the wrongful acts of the
organization towards other member states.312 However, the constituting treaty of an
international organization can provide for a limited responsibility of the organization with
respect to wrongful acts against its member states.313
The indirect responsibility is attributed to all member states (except in a case in which
a member state has been violated), regardless of whether the act which entails the
indirect responsibility was committed within a member state or a non-member state. 314
The indirect responsibility is also attributed to those member states which voted against
the wrongful act. 315
The member states are jointly and severally liable.316 A claimant subject can thus
present its claim to one member state and collect the whole reparation from this state.
This member state in turn has a claim of indemnification against the other member states.
310 Supra text accompanying notes 232-233.
311 Supra text accompanying notes 234-254 for conventional liability and notes 255-
257 for customary liability.
312 Supra text accompanying notes 258-260.
313 Supra text accompanying notes 261-265.
314 Supra text accompanying notes 267-276.
315 Supra text accompanying notes 274-275.
316 Supra text accompanying notes 284-287.
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In order to clarify the legal situation with regard to the international responsibility of
international organizations and their member states, it is proposed that the GA authorizes
the ILC to draft a treaty which establishes the legal principles found in this thesis. This
treaty could be the counterpart to the future treaty on state responsibility which is
currently drafted by the ILC. The treaty on the international responsibility of
international organizations should be open for signatures by states and international
organizations. 317
317 The same approach has been taken for the law of treaties. The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, supra note 8, established the law of treaties between
international organizations and other international organizations or states, closely
tracking the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 54. The former Convention is open for signatures by states and international
organizations according to its art.82, supra note 8, at 587-588.
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